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Looking Backward: The Twentieth Century Revolutions in
Psychiatry, Law, and Public Mental Health
SHELDON GELMAN*
I. INTRODUCTION
Do histories of psychiatry make a difference--or have legal implications
-in the present? Does our current situation help explain what historians say
about psychiatry's past? Focusing on the past half century-the era of
medications-this paper explores the reciprocal relationship between the
present and the past in psychiatry.'
Part U sketches the medical developments that constitute the subjects of
any history of psychiatry. This Part also examines related developments in
law. Part III introduces some problems of psychiatric historiography and
examines some historians' attempts to deal with them. Part IV analyzes the
account of psychiatry's past contained in Edward Shorter's well-regarded
book, A History of Psychiatry: From the Era of the Asylum to the Age of
Prozac.2 Finally, the conclusion suggests two relationships between legal
developments and the writing of psychiatric history.
II. PAST AND PRESENT
A. Before Medications
In the latter part of the nineteenth century, American psychiatrists lost
faith in the value of hospitalization alone and turned to physical interventions.'
They gave sedatives to make patients more manageable. And they performed
procedures with supposedly profound effects on mental illness. One of these,
"malarial fever therapy," proved effective in some cases. Neurosyphilis, an
infectious disease which manifested itself as insanity, sometimes responded
well when patients were exposed to malaria. Physicians intentionally gave
patients malaria and then, after a short interval, cured the physician-induced
* Professor of Law, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law. LL.M., Harvard Law School; J.D.,
Rutgers School of Law; A.B., Rutgers College. I have benefited from discussions about psychiatric history
with James G. Wilson and Joel J. Finer. Professor Wilson also commented on a draft of this article. I am
grateful to both colleagues for their help.
1. When I refer to "psychiatry" in this paper, I generally mean the branch of that discipline
concerned with serious mental diseases, such as schizophrenia.
2. EDWARD SHORTER, A HISTORY OF PSYCHIATRY, FROM THE ERA OF THE ASYLUM TO THE AGE
OF PROZAC (1997).
3. See SHORTER, supra note 2, at 190; Peter Sterling, Ethics and Effectiveness of Psychosurgery,
in CONTROVERSY IN PSYCHIATRY 126 (John Paul Brady & H. Keith H. Brodie eds., 1978).
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disease. Strangely enough, this procedure actually helped as many as fifty
percent of patients. Its inventor received the Nobel Prize.4
Other treatments, which seem no less strange, were probably less
effective. Prolonged sleep therapy, for example, was an invention of the last
years of the nineteenth century. Using various drugs, physicians kept patients
in deep sleep for days on end. Some patients supposedly responded well but
about one in twenty died.5 Also in the late nineteenth century, surgeons
removed the ovaries of women in an effort to cure mental illness. 6  This
procedure was both ineffective and invidious. Then, in the 1930s, psychia-
trists used a variety of agents to produce convulsions or to put mental patients
into comas.7 These procedures followed the model of malarial fever therapy;
hoping to ameliorate mental illness, physicians produced temporary pathologi-
cal states in patients. One of these treatments, electroconvulsive therapy, has
been shown effective in treating serious mental illness.8 Whatever their
effectiveness, patients greatly feared these procedures, for obvious reasons.
Lobotomy-the surgical cutting of brain connections-also appeared in
the 1930s.9 Its inventor, Egas Moniz, received the Nobel Prize for his
achievement in 1949.'0 Yet within four years of that triumph, the operation
fell into disuse in the United States. It produced permanent brain damage, and
in the 1950s-after the revelations of Nazi atrocities and the awakened
sensitivity to human rights resulting from the civil rights movement-the
American public had become unwilling to tolerate such damage as an instru-
ment of public health policy." Litigation threatened the operation as well.' 2
The same moral and legal considerations that had undone lobotomy
threatened the coma and convulsive therapies as well. They, too, seemed
brutal and crude, even if the patients who survived suffered no obvious
permanent damage. For that matter, the reaction to Nazism threatened the very
existence of mental hospitals. 3 During World War I, conscientious objectors
had served as mental hospital orderlies. After the war, they reported with
horror on conditions at the hospitals: the deteriorated buildings, infested with
4. SHORTER, supra note 2, at 194.
5. Id. at 205.
6. Sheldon Gelman, The BiologicalAlteration Cases, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1203, 1214 (1995);
Lawrence D. Longo, The Rise and Fall of Battey's Operation: A Fashion in Surgery, 53 BULL. HIST. MED.
244, 253, 259 (1979).
7. SHORTER, supra note 2, at 207.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 226.
10. Sterling, supra note 3, at 133.
11. SHELDON GELMAN, MEDICATING SCHIZOPHRENIA 23, 24-27 (1999); GERALD N. GROB, FROM
ASLYUM TO COMMUNITY: MENTAL HEALTH POLICY IN MODERN AMERICA 70-92 (1991).
12. See GELMAN, supra note 11, at 131.
13. Id. at 23.
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rodents and vermin; the abusive and uncaring staff; the pervasive smell of
human waste; the naked, neglected, and deteriorated patients. Frequent
comparisons were made with Nazi concentration camps. 14 By 1950, the
governors of various states had tired of the constant mental hospital scandals
and the ever-increasing costs of running the institutions. 5 The governors met
and decided that drastic changes were necessary. 6
B. The Appearance of Medications
In this social and political setting, medications made their debut.
Chlorpromazine, the first antipsychotic drug, appeared in 1952 and 1953 under
the trade name Thorazine.17 Named after Thor, the classical god of thunder,'8
Thorazine was marketed as electroconvulsive therapy in a bottle-the thunder,
as it were, without the flash of electricity. Psychiatrists also described it as a
"chemical lobotomy."' 9 Through the 1950s, psychiatrists usually regarded
medications as a therapy that produced pathology and worked in the same way
as the older biological treatments-convulsions, comas, and lobotomy-but
in a more convenient form.
20
Hospital wards with medicated patients became much calmer and more
orderly. Many patients, and particularly those with schizophrenia, improved,
sometimes dramatically.2 ' And by the middle of the 1950s, the patient
population in some state hospitals had declined, albeit very slightly.22 Any
decline, however, represented a historic achievement. Meanwhile, more anti-
psychotic medications appeared on the market and more patients received the
drugs.2
3
C. How Medications Work
Medications are clearly effective against some schizophrenic symptoms.
Clinicians, ignoring decades of research results, often exaggerate these
benefits.24 Thus, medications usually lessen the intensity of hallucinations or
14. Id.
15. See generally id.
16. GROB, supra note 11, at 70.
17. GELMAN, supra note 11, at 24.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 25.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 38-39.
22. GELMAN, supra note 11, at 40-41.
23. Id. at 40.
24. See generally id. at 13.
2003]
HeinOnline  -- 29 Ohio N.U. L. Rev. 533 2002-2003
OHIO NORTHERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
delusions.25 Yet "a substantial proportion of patients are resistant to treatment
with neuroleptics. ' 26  Moreover, little evidence indicates that medicated
patients--even the majority who respond favorably-enjoy better lifetime
outcomes than patients experienced before drugs, or that medicated patients'
quality of life has improved. Indeed, some studies suggest that medicated
patients fare worse in both respects.27 Moreover, most investigators find
standard antipsychotics ineffective against the negative symptoms of
schizophrenia, such as withdrawal from social life.28 Describing patients who
had responded favorably to medication in a 1975 study, for example, three
leading researchers found that although all patients were in remission from all
psychotic signs, this left room for considerable psychopathology, as well as
vocational and interpersonal difficulties.2 9 Their patients ran the gamut from
those with a complete lack of psychopathology and with no functional
impairment to others with chronical dysphoria (unhappiness) and marked
vocational and social ineptitude, chronic psychiatric invalids supported by
public assistance who led dismal, empty, withdrawn lives.30 But none had
delusions, hallucinations, disorganized speech, or bizarre behavior. 3'
Along with symptom reduction, medications also reduce the risk of a
patient relapsing and suffering another acute psychotic episode. Yet it is not
true that all relapses result from the failure to take medication, as clinicians
often claim. Nor will every patient relapse without medication. In fact, about
thirty to forty percent of medicated patients, as compared to about sixty to
eighty percent of patients who discontinue medications, relapse over a two-
year period.32 Although substantial, this difference should not obscure the fact
that many patients will remain free of relapse for substantial periods off
medication-and that many patients will relapse despite receiving treatment.
Moreover, these relapse estimates probably exaggerate the real differences.
Two distinguished researchers in 1995 reviewed the relapse literature and
discovered that
[a]n extraordinarily large (13-fold) excess of relapse risk arose within
the first 3 months after discontinuing neuroleptic [antipsychotic]
treatment (50% vs 3.8%). The cumulative relapse risk rose moder-
25. Id.
26. Kenneth L Davis et al., Dopamine in Schizophrenia: A Review and Reconceptualization, 148
AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1474, 1474 (1991).
27. See generally GELMAN, supra note 11, at 189, 191.
28. See generally id.
29. See generally Arthur Rifkdn et al., Akinesia: A Poorly Recognized Drug-Induced Extrapyramidal
Behavioral Disorder, 32 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 672 (1975).
30. See id.
31. See id.
32. GELMAN, supra note 11, at 186-91.
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ately for those continued on maintenance medication to an average of
28.5% by 2 years. In contrast, there was little additional gain of risk
after the first 3 months after drug discontinuation, with a maximal risk
of 54% to 62% by 12 months. The relative risk fell over time to less
than twofold.33
These researchers posited an "iatrogenic-pharmacologic stress effect"
befalling patients who started-and then stopped-medications. 3' This effect,
which could be minimized by very gradually discontinuing medication, made
patients worse off than if had they never started medications in the first place.
The result was "inflate[d] ' '35 estimates of the advantage conferred by
medication and "clinical risks for morbidity or even mortality ... [that]
sometimes exceed those associated with the natural history of the untreated
illness. 36 Put differently, patients who had never received medication would
relapse at rates much closer to the relapse rate of patients who received
continued medication.
D. Side Effects
Medications cause serious and frequent side effects. 37  They produce
mental distress, which can become severe, in perhaps a quarter to a half of
patients. Many feel anxious, uneasy, or tormented. Other patients lose will
power or initiative; their heads feel fuzzy. 38 These last effects are common and
they explain why psychiatrists once described medications as "chemical
lobotomies., 39
Comparable numbers of patients develop abnormal physical movements
on medications. Fingers and limbs tremble, jaws move, and tongues
protrude,' or else patients develop a "masked face" and stiff gait that resemble
the symptoms of Parkinson's disease.4 These physical effects, like the
33. Ross J. Baldessarini & Adele C. Viguera, Neuroleptic Withdrawal in Schizophrenic Patients, 52
ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 189, 189 (1995).
34. Id. at 190.
35. Id. at 191.
36. Id.
37. The following discussion of side effects is based on the account in GELMAN, supra note 1I,
passim.
38. For discussion of drug induced mental distress, see Theodore Van Putten & Philip R.A. May,
Subjective Response as a Predictor of Outcome in Pharmacology: The Consumer Has a Point, 35 ARCHIVES
GEN. PSYCHIATRY 477, 479 (1978).
39. GELMAN, supra note 11, at 25.
40. See id. at 6.
41. SHORTER, supra note 2, at 253.
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subjective ones, can range from mild to severe. There are also potentially fatal
side effects affecting heart function,42 but these seem to be rare.
Some involuntary movements that drugs induce-and particularly
purposeless movements called dyskinesias-become persistent or permanent,
reflecting medication-caused damage to the brain or nervous system.43
"Tardive dyskinesia" is the best known effect of this kind. Because of its
potential permanence, and because it is seen so often in medicated patients,
tardive dyskinesia has been regarded for the last thirty years as the most
significant side effect of medications.'
Tardive dyskinesia raised the prospect of widespread, permanent
neurological damage from drugs. Once it became clear that the public reviled
lobotomy, psychiatrists had stopped describing medications as a chemical form
of the surgery. The last such description I have found occurred in the early
1960s. Yet tardive dyskinesia threatened to make drugs chemical lobotomies
all over again-with the possibly profound public and legal consequences.
Biological therapies other than lobotomy had produced only transient damage
to body or brain-comas, for example, or convulsions-and even these
therapies had become suspect in the eyes of the public and government
regulators. For good reason, psychiatrists feared that widespread permanent
brain damage-if it existed-would lead to severe limits on using medica-
tion.45
During the late 1950s, early reports about isolated cases of tardive
dyskinesia had appeared in Europe." Despite these reports and an editorial in
the Journal of the American Medical Association (JAMA) about the possibility
of permanent neurological damage from medication, 47 American clinicians and
researchers generally ignored tardive dyskinesia through the 1960s. The most
remarkable exception was George Crane, a National Institute of Mental Health
(NIMH) researcher who published articles and convened conferences on the
subject." In 1967, at a conference attended by eminent psychiatrists, Crane
announced his own findings: a quarter of the patients on a NIMH research
ward, he said, had tardive dyskinesia; the symptoms often persisted after
medications were withdrawn; the movements could be extremely bizarre; and
it appeared that the disorder was related to a patient's exposure to
42. GELMAN, supra note 11, at 104.
43. Id. at 6.
44. See C. Thomas Gualtieri & Robert L Sprague, Preventing Tardive Dyskinesia and Preventing
Tardive Dyskinesia Litigation, 20 PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY BULL. 346 (1984).
45. I discuss the potential impact of tardive dyskinesia in GELMAN, supra note 11, at 33.
46. The account of tardive dyskinesia in this paragraph, and in the two paragraphs that follow, is
based on id. at 77.
47. Editorial, Irreversible Side Effects of Phenothiazines, 191 JAMA 333, 333-34 (1965).
48. GELMAN, supra note 11, at 78.
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medication.4 9 Leaders of the profession at once attacked Crane's findings and
his professionalism. Crane was threatening to undo the progress brought by
drugs, one said, suggesting that flaws in Crane's personal make-up were
responsible." On the merits, the critics argued that Crane had not seen any
movements at all, that he had seen only movements symptomatic of schizo-
phrenia, that supposed tardive dyskinesia victims were merely licking their
lips, that their movements could be cured with a program of "deconditioning,"
that the movements were reversible rather than persistent, or that they were the
product of lobotomies." None of these often inconsistent criticisms had merit.
Over the next five years, Crane wrote prolifically about tardive dyskinesia
and urged drug companies and government regulators to recognize the
disorder.5 2 At the same time, a few other American researchers began report-
ing tardive dyskinesia rates as high, or even higher, than Crane' s. 53 On the
other side, leading psychiatrists did not attempt to refute these results. Instead,
they ignored them. With the exception of a 1968 article by Nathan Kline
claiming that the true tardive dyskinesia rate was 1 in 1,000,000 54 -an
absurdity-no well-known psychiatrist had anything to say about tardive
dyskinesia in print. Yet the weight of the research began to tell. In 1973-
almost fifteen years after the initial reports-an association of psychiatric
societies and government agencies issued a grudging, equivocal acknowledg-
ment that medications might cause tardive dyskinesia 5 This acknowledgment
included gross underestimates of the disorder's prevalence, but it was
accompanied by the decision of leading pharmaceutical companies to warn
about tardive dyskinesia in drug package inserts. 6 Despite these develop-
ments, as late as 1976, Jonathon Cole, an eminent psychopharmacologist,
argued that tardive dyskinesia almost always resulted from prior damage to the
brain, not caused by drugs, and that the disorder had virtually no implications
for drug prescribing.5
By 1980, most researchers had accepted the fact that medications caused
tardive dyskinesia and that the condition often became permanent. In part, this
49. Id. at 78-80; see George E. Crane, Tardive Dyskinesia in Schizophrenic Patients Treated with
Psychotropic Drugs, 9 AGGRESSOLOGIE 209, 212, 216 (1967); George E. Crane & George Paulson,
Involuntary Movements in a Sample of Chronic Mental Patients and Their Relation to the Treatment with
Neuroleptics, 3 INT'L J. NEUROPSYCHIATRY 286 (1968).
50. GELMAN, supra note 11, at 81 (quoting Nathan S. Kline, On the Rarity of 'Irreversible' Oral
Dyskinesias Following Phenothiazines, 124 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 48, 51 (1968)).
51. Id.
52. See id. at 96-108.
53. Id. at 88.
54. Id. at 81 (quoting Kline, supra note 50, at 5 1).
55. GELMAN, supra note 11, at 96-98.
56. Id. at 103.
57. Id. at 106-07.
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change caused some high-profile lawsuits, in at least one of which a federal
judge castigated psychiatrists for refusing to acknowledge the disorder.58 In
litigation, the standard psychiatric tactic of ignoring tardive dyskinesia had
proved disastrous; it seemed perverse when psychiatrists failed to notice what
was apparent to everyone else in the courtroom. The litigation, in turn, was
based on the increasing number of research reports about the disorder.59 At
this time, although many research estimates of prevalence remained in the
range of ten to twenty percent, a few psychiatrists offered much higher
figures. 6 Cole himself did a sudden about-face in the late 1970s, at one point
urging that half of patients should be withdrawn from medications because of
the risk of tardive dyskinesia and because of the lack of benefits from drugs.6'
Throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, research estimates of tardive
dyskinesia's prevalence rose steadily. By 1993, the authors of the Yale
Tardive Dyskinesia Study reported that "[a]bout two of every three patients
maintained on neuroleptic treatment can be expected to develop persistent TD
[tardive dyskinesia] within 25 years of continued exposure. 62 The authors
also explained why published prevalence estimates were lower, even in the
1990s, and many of these reasons were hardly flattering to psychiatry.63 For
one, researchers "often classify mild cases as noncases." 64 For another, "TD
cases may be less likely than noncases to be selected [by researchers] for
prevalence studies."65 Moreover, "the proportion of patients in most cross-
sectional studies with more than 10 years of exposure [to medications] is
small, possibly because [such] ... patients [are] less likely than patients with
less exposure to be selected for these studies." 66 For those reasons, "preva-
lence findings may indicate very little about the occurrence ...of TD in
specific populations at risk. '67 It appeared that, even after the almost two
decade delay in recognizing tardive dyskinesia, many researchers still took
pains to produce misleadingly low estimates of its extent.
58. Rennie v. Klein, 476 F. Supp. 1294, 1300 (D. N.J. 1979), modified and remanded, 653 F.2d 836
(3d Cir. 1981), remanded, 458 U.S. 1119(1982); Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342, 1353 (D. Mass. 1979).
I represented the Rennie plaintiffs during the trial and appeals.
59. Sheldon Gelman, Mental Hospital Drugging-Atomistic and Structural Remedies, 32 CLEV. ST.
L. REv. 221, 230 (1983-84).
60. GELMAN, supra note 11, at 97.
61. Id. at 109 (citing George Gardos & Jonathan 0. Cole, Maintenance Antipsychotic Therapy: Is
the Cure Worse Than the Disease?, 133 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 32, 36 (1976)).
62. William M. Glazer et al., Predicting the Long-Term Risk of Tardive Dyskinesia in Outpatients
Maintained on Neuroleptic Medications, 54 J. CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 133, 137 (1993).
63. Id. at 138.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Glazer, supra note 62, at 138.
[Vol. 29
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The clinical picture was worse, if anything. Clinicians continued to
ignore tardive dyskinesia even after researchers had recognized it. In 1978, a
lawsuit examined prescribing practices in the state hospital system of New
Jersey and, as of that date, no patient in the entire four hospital system- con-
taining, at any one time, over five thousand patients-had ever been acknowl-
edged to have tardive dyskinesia.68 Yet George Crane, who testified in the
case as an expert, had found over a hundred tardive dyskinesia cases, including
severe ones, during a two-day visit to some wards.69 Crane also testified that
the failure to acknowledge tardive dyskinesia was typical of psychiatric
practice nationally. 7° Again, in 1980, a "task force" of the American Psychia-
tric Association published a major report about tardive dyskinesia, making
recommendations about drug treatment and dosages.71 Four years later, two
researchers reported that the Task Force's guidelines were "honored more in
the breach than the keeping" and that researchers' recommendations "seem to
have had little, if any, effect on actual physician behavior. '72 To the same
effect, researchers reported in 1991 that eighteen percent of chronic patients
in a California state facility suffered from tardive dyskinesia, and all of them-
without exception-received medications continuously.73
Clinicians slighted other side effects too. Hospital charts might record
that a patient paced back and forth or suffered from stiffness, and doctors often
administered other medications in hopes of ameliorating these effects.
Whether the side effect abated or not, however, it was very rarely thought to
preclude the use of medication.
During the late 1970s and early 1980s as some researchers studied tardive
dyskinesia, others turned their attention to the subjective side effects of
medications.74 They found that patients frequently experienced unpleasant
reactions and intensely disliked them, while clinicians generally ignored
patients' distress.75  Researchers also found that patients who experienced
distress generally did poorly on drugs and suggested withdrawing medications
68. For discussion of Crane's findings in the Rennie case, including citations to the trial record, see
Gelman, supra note 59, at 231-34.
69. Id. at 233.
70. GELMAN, supra note I1, at 136.
71. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, TARDIVE DYSKINESIA: REPORT OF THE AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC
ASSOCIATION TASK FORCE ON LATE NEUROLOGICAL EFFECTS OF ANTIPSYCHOTIC DRUGS (1980).
72. Gualtieri & Sprague, supra note 44, at 347.
73. John Sramek et al., Prevalence of Tardive Dyskinesia Among Three Ethnic Groups of Chronic
Psychiatric Patients, 42 HOSP. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 590, 591 (1991).
74. Theodore Van Putten, Why Do Schizophrenic Patients Refuse to Take Their Drugs, 31 ARCHIVES
GEN. PSYCHIATRY 67 (1974); see generally Philip R.A. May et al., Predicting the Outcome ofAntipsychotic
Drug Treatment from Early Response, 137 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1088 (1980); Van Putten & May, supra note
38, at 480.
75. Van Putten & May, supra note 38, at 1089.
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(or at least drastically reducing the dose) in such cases.76 Reviewing the
question in 2002, David Healy called patient distress "the darkest side of anti-
psychotics,"77 and observed,
Senior figures in the field . . . readily agreed that akathisia [drug
induced nervousness and pacing] and the dysphoria [unhappiness or
despondency], which were part and parcel of the effects of neuro-
leptics on extrapyramidal systems, were a more frequently occurring
and more subjectively distressing problem than tardive dyskin-
esia .... For many there was little doubt that akathisia led to a toll of
suicides and violence.78
Healy added that "the megadose regimes of... drugs used in the 1970s and
1980s minimized the problem because in high doses these neuroleptics
degraded the capacity to act on any of the murderous or suicidal impulses that
[medication induced] akathisia can give rise to. 79
In fact, clinicians prescribe medication continuously to nearly everyone
who has suffered an acute schizophrenic episode-even though research shows
that many do not benefit. In 1976, Jonathon Cole concluded that "perhaps as
many as 50% of [outpatients] might not be worse off if their medications were
withdrawn." 80 Using the figures cited earlier,8 if twenty percent of patients
will not relapse off medication, and thirty percent will relapse despite
medication, the fifty percent figure seems justified.
Clinicians also use grossly excessive doses. George Crane had urged
substantial dose reductions in the early 1970s.82 And as concern over tardive
dyskinesia increased, so did warnings by researchers about dosage. In the face
of such cautions, however, clinicians increased drug doses. Comparing
prescribing practices at a number of institutions in 1973-the date a presti-
gious professional group first warned clinicians about tardive dyskinesia-
with prescribing practices at the same institutions in 1982, researchers reported
that "the overall mean dose doubled at each center" 83-a finding that
"confirm[ed] the impression of many clinicians and investigators that higher
doses of antipsychotics are routinely being used."84 Another study, by Julie
76. May et al., supra note 74, at 1089.
77. DAVID HEALY, THE CREATION OF PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 275 (2002).
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Gardos & Cole, supra note 61, at 35-36.
81. See supra text accompanying note 61.
82. GELMAN, supra note 11, at 103. Crane's views are described in id. at 102-06.
83. Gerard T. Reardon et al., Changing Patterns of Neuroleptic Dosage Over a Decade, 146 AM.
J. PSYCHIATRY 726, 727, 729 (1989).
84. Id. at 729.
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Magno Zito, examined prescribing at a New York hospital in the 1980s. 5 Zito
found patients receiving doses "clearly in excess of current guidelines" 6 and
psychiatrists increasingly using medications whose side effects were less
visible, but also more distressing to patients.87 Summarizing matters in 1995,
two researchers wrote that
[y]ears of a narrow treatment focus on psychosis and rehospitalization
(rather than broad psychopathologic and quality-of-life assessment),
... and the false hope that increasing drug dose will increase efficacy
have led to excessive medication for most patients despite adverse
effects, high rates of noncompliance, and patient dissatisfaction. 8
E. Atypical Antipsychotics
A newer class of medications, "atypicals," came into wide use during the
1990s. Clozapine, the first of these medications, had originally appeared in the
1960s. 89 It was recalled from the market, however, because some patients
developed a serious blood disorder.9" In the late 1980s, clozapine became
generally available again. Within a few years other atypicals-which did not
produce the blood disorder or, it seems, all of the same benefits-joined
clozapine on the market.9'
Compared to standard medications, atypicals affect a different profile of
brain neurotransmitters and, in turn, produce a different profile of side effects.
Stiffness, tremor, and movement disorders appear less frequently than with
standard drugs.92 Evidence suggests that tardive dyskinesia occurs less
frequently too. 93 At the same time, currently available atypicals are more
likely to produce weight gain, seizures, and life-threatening heart disorders
than standard drugs.94 Despite the seriousness of these effects, they are
85. Julie Magno Zito et al., Pharmaco-Epidemiology in 136 Hospitalized Schizophrenic Patients,
144 Am. J. PSYCHIATRY 778 (1987).
86. Id. at 782.
87. Id. at 781.
88. William T. Carpenter Jr. & Carol A. Tamminga, Why Neuroleptic Withdrawal in Schizophrenia?,
52 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 192, 192 (1995).
89. HEALY, supra note 77, at 243-44, 251-64.
90. Id. at 239-41, 242.
91. /d. at 251-64.
92. GELMAN, supra note 11, at 205-06.
93. GELMAN, supra note 11, at 206; Daniel E. Casey, Tardive Dyskinesia andAtypicalAntipsychotic
Drugs, 35 SCHIZOPHRENIA RES. S61, 565 (1999).
94. Ross J. Baldessarini & Frances R. Frankenburg, Clozapine: A Novel Antipsychotic Agent, 324
NEW ENG. J. MED. 746, 751 (tbl. 3) (1991); Brian C. Lund et al., Clozapine Use in Patients with
Schizophrenia and the Risk of Diabetes, Hyperlipidemia, and Hypertension: A Claims-Based Approach, 58
ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 1172, 1174 (2001) (describing weight gain and higher risks of diabetes in
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supposed to occur rarely enough for many psychiatrists to prefer atypicals.95
Many patients prefer them as well. Treatment with atypicals costs many times
more than treatment with older, standard agents, however. In fact, atypicals
appeared at a time when the patients on some older antipsychotics were
expiring."
The side effects of atypicals are becoming a more serious concern. In
2001, FDA physicians warned of an almost one hundred fold increase in
certain serious heart disorders when patients take clozapine.97 Other atypicals
may, or may not, resemble clozapine in this way. By the same token, they
may cause more tardive dyskinesia and other side effects than clozapine.
Psychiatrists have claimed two advantages for atypicals, in addition to a
more benign profile of side effects. First, some patients who respond poorly
to standard drugs improve dramatically on atypicals. Second, atypicals have
been said to produce improvements in the negative symptoms of schizophrenia
-social withdrawal for example.9"
In larger studies, however, the newer drugs do not appear more effective
than older drugs overall-even if some treatment refectory patients do respond
well to clozapine. 99 Moreover, claims for atypicals' effectiveness against
negative symptoms have become increasingly suspect.°" Indeed, David Healy
and others have argued that claims for the superiority of atypicals on this score
generally result from comparing low doses of the newer drugs to excessively
high-and more harmful-doses of standard medications.10'
A 1988 study supposedly showed clozapine superior to a standard drug
in treatment refractory patients;w that result led to clozapine's return to the
younger patients). Authorities on the question of heart disorder are cited infra note 97.
95. See GELMAN, supra note I1, at 29.
96. See id. at 205.
97. The warning by FDA physicians appears in Lois La Grenade et al., Letter: Myocarditis and
Cardiomyopathy Associated with Clozapine Use in the United States, 345 NEW ENG. J. MED. 224 (200 1)
(reporting that patients on clozapine suffered two serious heart complications at eighty times the rate of the
general population). On the side effect profiles of clozapine and the "atypical" drugs, see HEALY, supra note
77, at 263 (noting that atypicals, unlike clozapine, appear capable of inducing tardive dyskinesia in tests);
Andrew Herxheimer & David Healy, Arrhythmias and Sudden Death in Patients Taking Antipsychotic
Drugs: High Doses and Combinations of Certain Drugs are Best Avoided, 325 BRIT. MED. J. 1253 (2002)
(noting that at least one atypical drug, as well as some standard antipsychotic drugs, produced two to five
times the rate of cardiac arrests and ventricular arrhythmias-and patients deaths-as clozapine); Carol E.
Koro et al., An Assessment of the Independent Effects of Olanzapine and Risperidone Exposure on the Risk
of Hyperlipidemia in Schizophrenic Patients, 59 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 1021, 1024 (2002) (reporting
that one of two atypicals tested produced significantly higher rates of hyperlipidemia).
98. For discussion, see GELMAN, supra note 11, at 207.
99. See Baldessarini & Frankenburg, supra note 94, at 751.
100. See id. at 752.
101. HEALY, supra note 77, at 270 (comparing clozapine with chlorpromazine).
102. John Kane et al., Clozapine for the Treatment-Resistant Schizophrenic: A Double-Blind
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marketplace. However, this study had compared "moderate doses" of cloza-
pine to high doses of the standard medication.0 3 Commenting three years
later, Ross J. Baldessarini argued that some of the apparent benefits from
clozapine may have resulted from relief from the side effects caused by the
standard drug.'O° In his recently published account of the medication era,
David Healy argues that
there was no excuse for the clinical trials of the other atypicals, which
came after the work of Baldessarini .... The trials with olanzapine,
quetiapine, and risperidone compared these new compounds to halo-
peridol [an older, standard drug] in doses approaching 20 milligrams
per day [a relatively high dose]. Even so, they were not obviously
more effective than haloperidol, except for their marginal benefits on
negative symptoms. 5
In Healy' s view, the rapid rise of atypicals has resulted from "wishful thinking
and aggressive marketing" by drug companies."° In fact, according to Healy
"the changes that patients and clinicians were witnessing"'0 7 in patients on
atypicals,
were often the consequences of changing from the equivalent of more
than 5,000 milligrams of chlorpromazine per day to a dose of cloza-
pine or a newer [atypical] agent equivalent to 300 milligrams of
chlorpromazine per day. There were obvious difficulties for clinicians
in accepting that even part of the benefits they were witnessing with
the new drugs might stem from the fact that they were not now
poisoning their patients to the same extent as previously .... As
patients recovered from drug-induced negativity, the resulting benefits
in turn seemed to validate the concept that atypicals had unique effects
on negative states.0"
Finally, Healy notes that "[b]y the year 2000 a number of academic centers
were running studies randomizing patients who had not responded to clozapine
or other 'atypicals' to adjunctive treatment with standard neuroleptics."'
These investigations, which "reverse[d]" the 1988 study that had made
Comparison with Chlorpromazine, 45 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 789, 796 (1988).
103. Baldessarini & Frankenburg, supra note 94, at 750.
104. Id.
105. HEALY, supra note 77, at 269.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 270.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 274.
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clozapine as the drug of choice for treating refractory patients,"10 prompted
Healy to suggest a counterfactual: "had haloperidol been withdrawn because
of [a serious blood disorder, as clozapine was withdrawn], . . . and [had]
clozapine-like compounds been left to dominate the marketplace, haloperidol
might later have been rediscovered as a drug that, given in astonishingly low
doses, could produce remarkable results in managing treatment-resistant
schizophrenia.""'
With regard to both standard and atypical medication, Healy suggests that
the customary methods of drug evaluation, testing and marketing-combined
with the approach to disease classification in recent editions of the American
Psychiatric Association Diagnostic and Statistical Manual-have led
psychiatrists to judge the effectiveness of medications in terms of standardized
symptom checklists, rather than their overall effect on patients. Since the
1960s, Healy believes psychiatrists' thinking has been influenced significantly
by the marketing efforts of large pharmaceutical companies-a criticism
echoing George Crane's thirty years before.
F. Public Mental Health and Deinstitutionalization
By the late 1970s, a new public health system had emerged." 12 No longer
were patients confined in long-term state hospitals as a matter of course.
Instead, people with schizophrenia received antipsychotic medications in the
,,community."' " They returned to hospitals only for relatively brief stays and
only so that psychiatrists could adjust-or reinstitute-a regimen of medica-
tion. 14 This new system, known as "deinstitutionalization," ' 5 commenced in
earnest in the late 1960s-after medications had been available for a decade
and a half.
Yet not all deinstitutionalized patients would take-or respond favorably
to--medications. These patients lived and died in a deteriorated state outside
of the hospitals."16  Some became homeless, with increasing numbers
hallucinating on the streets of major American cities.' Others lived under
grossly substandard conditions in boarding or nursing homes."'
110. HEALY, supra note 77, at 274.
111. Id.
112. On deinstitutionalization and the new system of public mental health, see GELMAN, supra note
11, at 38-43, 166-67.
113. Id. at 139.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 5.
116. Id. at 167.
117. GELMAN, supra note 1I, at 167.
118. See RAEL JEAN ISAAC & VIRGINIA C. ARMAT, MADNESS IN THE STREETS: HOW PSYCHIATRY AND
THE LAW ABANDONED THE MENTALLY ILL 101 (1990).
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Today, the system of community medication has become more firmly
entrenched. State hospitals, and the amount of time patients stay in them, have
continued to shrink. Homelessness has increased, along with boarding and
nursing home scandals." 9 Some states have taken small steps toward
increasing the number of available hospital beds, but the basic tendencies in
public mental health remain unchanged.
G. Litigation
As deinstitutionalization got underway in the late 1960s, state hospitals
suddenly appeared on the radar screens of courts. Spurred by public minded
lawyers citing constitutional law, numerous courts ordered enhanced hearings
and stricter legal standards for hospital commitment. 120 Lower courts also
proclaimed a constitutional right to treatment and, by way of enforcing the
right, ordered substantial improvements to the public hospitals' physical plant,
operations, and staffing.' 2' Moreover, starting in 1978-about a decade after
the initial decisions on commitment law-some courts recognized a limited
(and in my opinion, usually ineffective) right to refuse medications. 2 2 With
these last cases, the revolution in constitutional law collided head-on with the
revolutions in clinical psychopharmacology and public mental health. Many
patients wanted to refuse drugs, but the new public health system could hardly
survive if they did.
The conflict did not last long. In a series of decisions handed down
between 1979 and 1990, the U.S. Supreme Court brought the legal revolution
to a halt. 23 While evading some basic questions, 24 these decisions clearly
signaled that lower courts had gone too far. In general, the Court required
119. See id. at 4, 327.
120. E.g., Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972), remanded 414 U.S. 473 (1974).
For discussion of litigation developments generally, see GELMAN, supra note 11, at 121-40, 167-77.
121. The leading decision was Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373, 378-79 (M.D. Ala. 1972).
122. Rennie v. Klein, 476 F. Supp. 1294, 1307 (D. N.J. 1979); Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342 (D.
Mass. 1979), affd in part, rev'd in part, and remanded, 634 F.2d 650 (I st Cir. 1980), vacated and remanded
by Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291 (1982), and overruled as explained in Cuesnongle v. Ramos, 835 F.2d
1486, 1500 n.12 (1st Cir. 1987).
123. Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 222, 227 (1990) (allowing prisons to forcibly medicate
even competent inmates provided that a panel that included a warden and prison doctors approved);
Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 321-23 (1982) (mandating deference to psychiatrists' "professional
judgment" in hospital decision-making and declining to recognize a right to treatment independent of the
right to physical liberty); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 604-05 (1979) (no prior hearing required when
minors are committed to a state institution).
124. In particular, the Court has never formally decided on the procedures required when adults are
committed to mental hospitals, or when children remain in the hospital after they have been committed, nor
has the Court decided whether a free standing right to treatment exists, apart from patients' right to liberty.
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deference to the professional judgment of psychiatrists.'25 The culmination of
this line of cases came in 1990, when the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the
practice of forcibly medicating state prison inmates-and, by implication,
patients in state hospitals-whenever a warden and prison doctor believed that
medication would serve a vaguely defined "medical interest" of a prisoner and
more importantly, the needs of the institution.'26
III. ADDRESSING THE PAST
When psychiatrists present the face of their profession to the world---or
when they look at their profession as if in a mirror-the image certainly does
not include neurologically damaged patients, out-of-control clinical practices,
or researchers inventing imaginary treatment benefits. Thus, a detailed history
of the field can mar psychiatry's picture of itself. For that reason, such
histories often strike psychiatrists as calculated insults.
The profession's interest in its past goes beyond professional pride. The
discipline's success greatly depends on how non-psychiatrists perceive it.
Insurers may fail to cover psychiatric services. Legislators may impose
burdensome, demeaning restrictions or restrict research funding. Judges can
award injunctions and damages. Other physicians can demean psychiatry.
Medical students can shun it. Patients may stay away. For these reasons,
psychiatry is unusually sensitive about its image. Insecurity is an occupational
hazard of psychiatrists.
Psychiatry is rightly concerned about history. Just as past acts influence
our perception of the character of an individual, history influences our per-
ception of institutions, including professions. Based on past behavior, we
make judgments about an individual's competence and character. Based on
an institution's history, we do much the same thing.
Of course, it rarely makes sense to blame a profession, such as psychiatry,
for the past acts of its practitioners. But even if moral blame is inappropriate,
and even if no real entity--e.g., psychiatry-exists to receive such blame,
history still may tell us about the present capacities of an institution, discipline,
or profession. If someone says they blame psychiatry for some past episode-
lobotomy perhaps, or the removal of women's ovaries in the late nineteenth
century-they are probably speaking figuratively. They mean we have reason
to distrust psychiatrists' actions now, not that some entity called psychiatry
exists that warrants punishment for something in the past. When psychiatrists
cited their profession's achievements in neuroscience during the 1990s, they
typically did so as part of an implicit argument that psychiatry today is a
125. Romeo, 457 U.S. at 323.
126. Harper, 494 U.S. at 225.
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competent and thriving discipline. It is no different, however, if someone
draws negative inferences from past lapses by psychiatrists, instead of positive
inferences from past triumphs. Thus, questions about psychiatry's past tend
to become questions about its present, heightening historical controversy.1
27
Not surprisingly then, some psychiatrists have produced histories of the
medication era-and in particular, of the profession's response to tardive
dyskinesia-that attempt to explain away psychiatry's failures. According to
one such account, a general historical law-the so-called law of the new drug
-explained what happened. 2 According to this "law," physicians in every
medical specialty receive new therapies over-enthusiastically when they first
appear.2 9 There follows a stage of overreaction, during which physicians
become too critical of the formerly new therapy. 3' Finally, a state of balanced
judgment arrives, when physicians gain a realistic understanding of the
treatment. 3'
As applied to tardive dyskinesia, the law of the new drug supposedly
accounted for the psychiatric defaults of the 1960s and 1970s. Enthusiastic
about a new treatment, psychiatrists predictably and understandably had
overlooked a side effect. If the law of the new drug was correct, cardiologists
and urologists-indeed, all physicians-would have acted in the same way.
Taken literally, the theory meant that psychiatry's failure to recognize tardive
dyskinesia actually strengthened its claim to be an integral part of modem
medicine, since psychiatrists had acted in typical medical fashion.
The law of the new drug is specious applied to tardive dyskinesia, as I
have shown elsewhere. 132 It conflicts with the facts for one thing. Contrary
to what the theory predicts, psychiatrists in the 1950s were more ready to
recognize serious side effects-including persistent effects and including
dyskinesias-than psychiatrists became in the '60s or '70s. Thus, "over-
enthusiasm" appeared not at the outset of the drug era, as the theory supposes,
but closer to the middle. Moreover, proponents of the theory assumed that
prevalence estimates in the thirty to fifty percent range had to be excessive
since these estimates appeared during the second period of the drug era when
127. When psychiatrists make predictions about someone's dangerousness, they are doing much the
same thing-at least if their prediction relies on the person's past acts. Moreover, as is true of judgments
about institutions, predictions of dangerousness do not carry moral opprobrium.
128. See Daniel E. Casey & George Gardos, Introduction to TARDIVE DYSKINESIA AND
NEUROLEPTICS: FROM DOGMA TO REASON ix (Daniel E. Casey & George Gardos eds., 1986) [hereinafter
TARDIVE DYSKINESIA AND NEUROLEPTICS]. For further discussion of the law of the new drug, see GELMAN,
supra note 11, at 197.
129. GELMAN, supra note !1, at 197.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
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physicians were supposedly overly critical of a treatment. 33 Yet the higher
estimates were essentially correct. In fact, proponents assumed that the
"second period" of overreaction was underway only because they wanted to
declare those higher estimates wrong. These psychiatrists had reached
conclusions about the extent of an observable neurological disorder by
consulting historical laws, rather than medical research or their own eyes.
Self-interested professional history had replaced serious medical judgment. 13
Another flawed attempt at history came from Paul Appelbaum, a
psychiatrist who has specialized in legal topics. Appelbaum starts with the
assumption that medications are indicated for every seriously mentally ill
person. It follows that a legal right to refuse treatment must lead to medical
error and, for patients, personal calamity. In the late 1970s, when Appelbaum
believed that the law might recognize a substantial right to refuse medication,
he angrily denounced it as the "right to rot."' 35 In 1994, after it had become
clear that the law would not mandate significant changes in medication
practice, Appelbaum wrote a book analyzing the previous decades' develop-
ments in law and psychiatry.'36 Here, he expressed satisfaction that relatively
few patients had exercised a right to refuse, noting that things had not turned
out as badly as he had feared. 137 Yet Appelbaum's overriding and unchanging
assumption-that every patient should receive medication-is simply false on
purely medical grounds, and it undermines his various accounts of the era.
Assuming that every patient should receive medications, Appelbaum still
might have discussed side effects in a serious way. He did not do so, however.
Indeed, tardive dyskinesia earned only two entries in the index to Appelbaum's
book.138 The first reference occurs as Appelbaum is explaining why a lawyer,
who had filed a right to refuse treatment case, thought patients should enjoy
that right. 39 Appelbaum does not explain the lawyer's concern about tardive
dyskinesia or comment on it; he simply mentions the side effect in passing.
The second reference, also in passing, occurs as Appelbaum describes a trial
of that right to refuse case. "Detailed descriptions[,]" ' 4° Appelbaum writes,
133. This mistake appears in Thomas E. Hansen et al., Is There an Epidemic ofTardive Dyskinesia?,
in TARDIVE DYSKINESIA AND NEUROLEPTiCS, supra note 128, at 1, 6.
134. GELMAN, supra note 11, at 202.
135. Paul S. Appelbaum & Thomas Gutheil, "Rotting with Their Rights on ": Constitutional Theory
and Clinical Reality in Drug Refusal by Psychiatric In-Patients, 7 BULL. AM. PSYCHIATRY & L. 306 (1979);
Paul S. Appelbaum & Thomas Gutheil, The Boston State Hospital Case: "Involuntary Mind Control"; the
Constitution, and the "Right to Rot", 17 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 720 (1980).
136. PAUL S. APPELBAUM, ALMOST A REVOLUTION: MENTAL HEALTH LAW AND THE UMITS OF
CHANGE (1994).
137. See id. at 134.
138. Id. at 233.
139. Id. at 116.
140. Id. at 123.
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"were offered [at the trial] of many of the side-effects of antipsychotic
medications, especially tardive dyskinesia."' 141 Judging from these references,
tardive dyskinesia seems significant to Appelbaum only in relation to lawyers,
not patients-and not very significant, even at that. Appelbaum adds that the
"core" of the Boston court's eventual opinion focused on "legal arguments"-
as if tardive dyskinesia was an irrelevance.1
42
Although Appelbaum does not mention it, the Boston case was preceded
by a no less publicized ruling from a New Jersey federal court . 43 The New
Jersey decision found that the state hospitals had ignored tardive dyskinesia
and had systematically refused to diagnose it.44 Unlike the Boston case,
which relied on medical literature, the New Jersey litigation produced proof
of numerous patients with tardive dyskinesia and other side effects. 14' Had
Appelbaum described this case, a question might have arisen about physicians'
medical judgment. He avoided those questions by ignoring the case. The "law
of the new drug" theorists had at least acknowledged that psychiatrists
overlooked tardive dyskinesia; Appelbaum does not concede even that.
Accounts like Appelbaum's are remarkable. Nor does the fact that he was
analyzing legal developments explain his neglect of tardive dyskinesia. Just
the opposite is true. Consider an alternate history of medication refusal
litigation, a history like Appelbaum' s, but written from the other side. In this
alternate account, the benefits of medications would receive only two passing
mentions. The first would occur in connection with a particular lawyer's
decision to represent a psychiatrist whose drug prescribing had caused a severe
case of tardive dyskinesia. The second reference would note that some
testimony was given about medication's benefits in that case, but the testimony
had little to do with the "core" of the court's eventual ruling. Such a history
seems unlikely to be written, nor should it be. Yet accounts like Appelbaum' s
slight side effects occur in just the same way and are considered mainstream. 46
Could a professional historian do better than Paul Appelbaum or the law
of the new drug theorists? Edward Shorter, a professional historian, published
a full length history of psychiatry in 1997 entitled A History of Psychiatry:
141. APPELBAUM, supra note 136, at 123.
142. Id.
143. The Boston case was Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342 (D. Mass. 1979); the New Jersey case,
Rennie v. Klein, 476 F. Supp. 1294 (D. N.J. 1979).
144. See Rennie, 476 F. Supp. at 1300, 1302.
145. E.g., id. at 1302.
146. Histories driven by assumptions--even rigid assumptions-are not always unhelpful.
Appelbaum, for example, offers useful information about right to refuse treatment decisions and their
implementation. APPELBAUM, supra note 136, at 123.
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From the Era of the Asylum to the Age of Prozac.'47 To that history, we now
turn.
IV. EDWARD SHORTER'S HISTORY OF PSYCHIATRY
According to Shorter, a contest between two ideas defines the history of
psychiatry.'48 One is the idea of mental illness as a biological disease.'49 The
other is the idea that mental illness is not a biological disease but something
else, such as a problem resolvable by psychoanalysis. 5 ' In the late twentieth
century, Shorter argues, the biological idea decisively-and rightly-
prevailed.' 5'
A. The Three Stages of Psychiatric History
Shorter divides the history of psychiatry into a prelude and three stages.
During the prelude, in the early nineteenth century, psychiatry was "born" as
a discipline and the first asylums appeared. Stage number one, which Shorter
calls "the first biological psychiatry," emerged during the latter part of the
nineteenth century. 5 2 It represented "a movement of ideas rather than an exer-
cise in bricks and mortar"53-a movement of scientifically correct ideas as
psychiatrists came to understand that "major mental illnesses have a heavy bio-
logical and genetic component."'" This period was supplanted by stage two,
"the Psychoanalytic Hiatus," during the early twentieth century.'55 Shorter
thinks of this period as a dark age, a time when psychoanalysis obscured the
truths of the first biological psychiatry. History righted itself, however, during
stage three-the "second biological psychiatry"-which emerged by 1970.,56
At that time, "the progress of science within psychiatry"'' 57 and the success of
medications had relegated psychoanalysis to the margins and restored the "bio-
logical" paradigm to professional prominence.'58
It is noteworthy that when he constructs his stages of history, Shorter
gives a decisive role to an extremely general medical belief-a belief in the
biological basis of mental illness-rather than to treatments, treatment
147. SHORTER, supra note 2.
148. Id. at 69.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 145 ("Psychoanalytic Hiatus").
151. Id. (describing psychoanalysis as "an interruption").
152. SHORTER, supra note 2, at 69.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 93.
155. Id. at 145 (title of chapter five).
156. Id. at 239.
157. SHORTER, supra note 2, at 145.
158. Id.
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outcomes, or the experiences of patients. So long as psychiatrists believed in
the biological basis of mental illness, the field was on the right track in
Shorter's view. It does not matter whether the reigning biological ideas were
scientifically sound-something they were unlikely to be before the mid-to-
late twentieth century when psychiatrists learned more about brain
neurotransmitters. No matter how crude a nineteenth century theory, if it pre-
sumed a biological basis for the patient's disorder, it belonged to the first
biological psychiatry.
B. Treatments Before Medications
Major biological treatments-insulin coma therapy, electroconvulsive
therapy, and lobotomy-date from the 1930s and appeared during the so-
called psychoanalytic hiatus, not during the first or second biological psychia-
try. For that matter, medications appeared during the psychoanalytic period
too. In fact, Shorter portrays medications as one of the forces that undermined
psychoanalysis. Thus, during the supposedly psychoanalytic period, major
biological therapies thrived.
Shorter handles the mismatch between treatment and historical stages by
using a literary device. Rather than examine each treatment in the context of
the historical stage when it appeared, he devotes a separate chapter, called
"Alternatives,"159 to all of the biological treatments that preceded medications.
"In the first half of the twentieth century," Shorter writes, "[p]sychiatrists
could warehouse their patients in vast bins . . . . [Or they could employ]
psychoanalysis, a therapy suitable for the needs of wealthy people desiring
self-insight, but not for real psychiatric illnesses."'" "Caught between these
unappealing choices," Shorter observes, "psychiatrists sought alternatives"''
-and these alternatives took the form of biological treatments. Psychiatrists
discovered these therapies "serendipitously" as Shorter himself points out;62
they were not based on any knowledge of how the brain operated.
Discussing the detriments of these procedures, Shorter offers only the
briefest, capsule accounts. Comparing one early sedative to another, for
example, he notes that it was superior by virtue of "not tasting unpleasant, by
having few side effects, and by acting at therapeutic levels far beneath the
toxic dose."'163 Sleep therapy, he reports, produced mortality rates of five
159. Id. at 190.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. SHORTER, supra note 2, at 198 (describing the process of "drug discovery largely by serendipity"
that held sway until "the designed drug discovery of the second biological psychiatry").
163. id. at 202 (comparing barbital to potassium bromide).
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percent as patients developed pneumonia or cardiac complications."4 Insulin
coma therapy was "a dangerous procedure with a mortality [rate] of almost one
in a hundred."' 65  Describing camphor, a drug that induced convulsions,
Shorter remarks that "patients hated the feeling of anxiety preceding the fit, the
vomiting that camphor caused, and the pain in the muscles where it was
injected."'" Discussing another convulsive drug, cardiazol, Shorter quotes a
psychiatrist who abandoned the treatment because of the "'agonizing fears of
dying and crumbling away""" that it produced in patients. This psychiatrist
had always "sought to get away from the room"' 8 where the treatment was
administered because "'[tihe sight of the artificially produced attack of
epilepsy, especially of the contorted blue faces, was so awful."",
169
Shorter's discussion of the effectiveness of these procedures is even more
brief and rather remarkable. Repeatedly, Shorter says that these treatments
"appeared" or "seemed" to be effective, and he praises them for their effect on
psychiatrists' state of mind and for anticipating later psychiatric therapies.
Shorter appears more interested in how various treatments affected
psychiatrists and psychiatry than in how patients fared.
Of sleep therapy, for example, Shorter writes that it "seemed to be a
promising new therapy,"' 70 and
[flor the first time in the history of psychiatry, a drug therapy had
been described that seemed to alleviate major psychiatric illness with
a physical procedure. Whether . . . bromide sleep really did cure
patients is beside the point: A hint had been inserted into the
profession's collective thinking that some kind of cure with drugs
might be possible.'
7
'
Shorter's assessment of other biological therapies follows the same general
lines, sometimes in almost the same words. Insulin coma treatment, he writes,
"seemed to be a procedure that actually worked, at least for the short term,
without the extreme dangerousness of sleep therapy."' 72 Later, Ladislas von
Meduna pioneered the practice of inducing epileptic fits in psychiatric patients.
164. Id. at 205.
165. Id. at 212.
166. Id. at 216.
167. SHORTER, supra note 2, at 216 (quoting Max Miller, ERINNERUNGEN: ERLEBLE PSYCHIATRIEG
ESCHICHTE 244 (1982)).
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 205 (describing a form of sleep therapy used in 1919 and 1920).
171. Id. at 202.
172. SHORTER, supra note 2, at 214.
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Did patients improve? According to Shorter, "[t]he answer seemed to be
yes.' 73
Yet "seeming to work" apparently differs from actually working. When
Shorter describes medications, he writes that they, "truly worked,' ' 74 "did
work,"'175 or represent "[t]he first drug that worked."' 176  At another point,
Shorter manages to create the same ambiguity about whether treatments
"worked" using different phrasing. "Barbiturate narcosis, insulin coma, and
Metrazol convulsion,"' 177 he writes, "extend[ed] the promise of lasting remis-
sions and even cures."' 178 Was the "promise" of "lasting remissions" actually
fulfilled? Shorter does not say.
The sources that Shorter cites in connection with insulin coma therapy
shed additional light on how therapies "seem to work." After noting that
insulin treatment "seemed... to work,"'179 Shorter added something more sub-
stantial: "In the long term, it was discovered that insulin coma had about the
same success rate as barbiturate-sleep therapy. Both represented a substantial
improvement on what was available before, which is to say, nothing."'' 80 A
single footnote, referring to two sources, appears after this passage. The first
source, a 1957 article by Brian Ackner, Shorter cites in support of his claim
that "barbiturate narcosis" and insulin coma had comparable success rates.'
8
'
The second source is a 1987 article about insulin treatment by W.A. Cramond
that, according to Shorter, provides a "not unfavorable historical evaluation of
insulin coma therapy."'
8 2
Shorter cites the Ackner and Cramond articles to support his claim that
insulin coma therapy "seemed" to work, but both authors concluded that the
coma produced no therapeutic benefit whatsoever. 1 3  They attributed the
apparent success of insulin to the fact that staff, concerned about the danger
of fatalities, paid especially close attention to patients who had undergone it. "
Ackner's article, a classic, describes an experiment in which some patients
received standard insulin coma therapy and other patients were put into a deep
173. Id. at 215.
174. Id. at 238.
175. Id. at 268.
176. Id. at 246.
177. SHORTER, supra note 2, at 218.
178. Id.
179. Id. at214.
180. Id. (internal footnote omitted).
181. Brian Ackner et al., Insulin Treatment ofSchizophrenia: A Controlled Study, 2 LANCET 607,607-
11 (1957). For discussion of Ackner's article, see GELMAN, supra note 11, at 230-31.
182. SHORTER, supra note 2, at 386 n.93 (citing W.A. Cramond, Lessons from the Insulin Story in
Psychiatry, 21 AUSTL. & N.Z.J. PSYCHIATRY 320, 320-26 (1987)).
183. GELMAN, supra note 11, at 231.
184. Id. at 230.
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sleep designed to look like a coma. 85 The two groups of patients fared equally
well after six months. 86 Although Ackner had used barbiturates to induce
deep sleep, Shorter's reference to "barbiturate narcosis" treatment is
misleading. In fact, Ackner used the barbiturate-induced sleep as a placebo,
a device to keep patients and staff from learning who had received coma
treatment and who had not. 87 The sleep was brief, and the placebo procedure
had no connection to the "sleep therapy" that kept patients asleep for days at
a time. Shorter says that insulin coma and "barbiturate narcosis" proved
equally effective, but in light of Ackner' s article, that means only that insulin
coma treatment had proved no more effective than a placebo.
Ackner himself described the significance of his experiment as follows:
The results . ..do not demonstrate that the coma regime has no
therapeutic effect. During insulin therapy patients are subjected to
powerful group influence and receive increased medical and nursing
care in a special setting. Daily they are exposed as a group to the
threat of being rendered unconscious. Daily they are brought back to
consciousness by doctors and nurses on whom they become depen-
dent. The new relationships so built up cannot be ignored, for it could
be that the coma regime is helping to establish that lost capacity for
relationship with others. But the results suggest that insulin is not the
specific therapeutic agent of the coma regime as has so often been
claimed. 188
It appeared that, in Ackner's view, anything that "built up" relationships to the
same extent would prove equally effective.
Writing thirty years later during the medication era, Cramond accepted
Ackner's conclusion that staff attention-and not the physical intervention-
had benefited insulin patients. Cramond wrote: "As I look with anxiety at my
schizophrenic patients coping with the neurological deficits occasioned by
neuroleptic drugs, I not infrequently regret the passing of insulin and wish we
could use some other process to provide [the old effects].' 89 Cramond thereby
suggested that a placebo effect-indeed, any effect that attracted staff attention
-was preferable to medications.
Thus, Ackner and Cramond conclude that the insulin coma's sole benefit
lay in its psychological and social effects, and that biologically, it did nothing.
If anything, Ackner's account makes the procedure sound more like a
185. Id.; Ackner, supra note 181, at 607.
186. GELMAN, supra note 11, at 231; Ackner, supra note 181, at 611.
187. GELMAN, supra note 11, at 231; Ackner, supra note 181, at 609-10.
188. GELMAN, supra note 11, at 230-31 (quoting Ackner, supra note 181, at 611).
189. Id. at 233 (quoting Cramond, supra note 182, at 320).
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psychoanalytic experience than a biological therapy, as patients "built up"
relationships with staff.'9° Shorter, on the other hand, leaves the impression
that there was good reason to think insulin coma effective and cites Cramond
and Ackner-who regard the procedure as a placebo--in support of his posi-
tion. His citation of Ackner and Cramond highlights the misleading ambiguity
in Shorter's oft-repeated claim that older therapies "seemed" to work. Had
Shorter said that the treatments only seemed to work--but actually did not-
his book would read very differently. 9'
Moreover, if Ackner and Cramond are right, the entire premise of
Shorter's "Alternatives" chapter is mistaken. Biological treatments did not
offer the only hope available to psychiatrists before the drug era. Indeed, once
properly understood, they offered no hope at all. The real hope for patients,
according to Ackner and Cramond, lay in staff-patient relationships and other
non-biological techniques. 92
The effectiveness of two other treatments, electroconvulsive therapy
(ECT) and lobotomy, receives somewhat more consideration from Shorter. He
believes that the forces of antipsychiatry pilloried ECT unfairly and, for that
reason, he wants to demonstrate the procedure's usefulness.' 93 Lobotomy, on
the other hand, crossed an ethical line in his view. 4 Thus, ECT and lobotomy
both have contemporary relevance: alone, among all the pre-medication
biological treatments, ECT remains in wide use while lobotomy is the
treatment best remembered as a mistake.
To establish ECT's efficacy, Shorter describes one case, the first use of
the procedure by its discoverer, Cerletti. "After eleven applications of
ECT,"' 95 Shorter writes, "the patient.., did get well and was discharged from
the [hospital]."' 96 Cerletti reported that after a year, the patient remained "per-
190. See Ackner, supra note 181, at 611.
191. Healy observes that insulin coma treatment had undoubted effects on the brain. HEALY, supra
note 77, at 53-56. While acknowledging Ackner's study and also the likelihood that insulin coma affected
staff patient relations for the better, Healy leaves open the possibility that some clinical benefits from the
procedure resulted from its neurological effects. "[S]omething probably was going on in the [insulin]
patients that called forth placebo responses in the staff ..... Id. at 54. Healy also suggests, as Shorter did,
that "[plerhaps both [barbiturate narcosis and insulin coma treatment] worked." Id. Thus, Healy-unlike
Shorter-defends his conclusions about insulin coma treatment; he does not rely on ambiguities to make
his point. At the same time, I do not believe that Healy gives Ackner's results their full due. If a brief sleep
had the same therapeutic benefits as a coma, it seems extremely unlikely that the coma's effects on the
brain-which, of course, are nothing like the effects of sleep-were producing the clinical benefits. For the
rest, I do not believe that Healy improves on Ackner's analysis.
192. See GELMAN, supra note 11, at 231.
193. See SHORTER, supra note 2, at 221-24.
194. Id. at 229.
195. Id. at 221.
196. Id.
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fectly well,"'197 even though the man's wife described episodes in which he
heard voices. 198 Based only on this single case, Shorter concludes that "ECT
was not a cure for schizophrenia. But it represented a great alleviation of the
disabling symptoms of psychotic illness, and permitted individuals to function
more or less normally."'99 In similar fashion, by describing the case of a single
patient in 1977, Shorter illustrates the efficacy of ECT against depression.00
Shorter also summarizes the 1990 judgment by an American Psychiatric
Association task force that "'ECT is an effective treatment for . . . major
depression,' for manic depressive illness[,] ... mania, and psychotic schizo-
phrenia. '20 ' Forgetting his own scheme of historical stages (ECT in fact dates
from the psychoanalytic hiatus),20 2 Shorter concludes that "[t]he ability of the
new biological psychiatry to make individuals [like this one] better represents
an accomplishment of historic dimensions. 2 3 If there was an "achievement
of historic dimensions," as Shorter says, it occurred well before the second
biological psychiatry began, and the achievement had no relationship to any
deeper understanding of the brain. Nor does Shorter tell us enough about ECT
or the vast literature about it to justify his claims about an historic feat. Older
treatments, including simple hospitalization, have also proved effective against
depression. ECT may be superior to these older methods or provide relief
more quickly than they do, but Shorter does not even attempt to explain how.
If ECT survived the advent of medications because it worked so well,
lobotomy did not survive, in Shorter's view, because it was unethical.
"Although lobotomy did tend to tranquilize the raving patients who were
management problems, 2 1 Shorter writes, "it generally deprived them of their
judgment and social skills. '20 5 According to a medical text quoted by Shorter,
"'[it is probable that every individual after the operation is happier than
before, but this may be brought at too great a cost, not only to himself but to
society ....,,20 Shorter himself reaches the conclusion that "[iln retrospect,
frontal lobotomy was indefensible for ethical reasons. '27 Lobotomy is, in fact,
197. Id.
198. SHORTER, supra note 2, at 221.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 286-87. The patient was Norman Endler, a psychologist who had opposed the use of ECT
until he himself underwent the procedure.
201. Id. at 285 (quoting AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, THE PRACTICE OF ELECTROCONVULSIVE THERAPY:
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR TREATMENT, TRAINING AND PRIVILEGING: A TASK FORCE REPORT 7-8 (1990)).
202. ECT was over fifty years old at the time of the American Psychiatric Association report.
203. SHORTER, supra note 11, at 287.
204. Id. at 227.
205. Id.
206. Id. (quoting WILLIAM SARGANT & ELIOT SLATER, AN INTRODUCTION TO PHYSICAL METHODS
OF TREATMENT IN PSYCHIATRY 145 (1944)).
207. Id. at 229.
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the only major treatment in psychiatry that Shorter criticizes in this---or, for
that matter, any other-way.
Despite-or perhaps, because of-his judgment about the unethical char-
acter of lobotomy, Shorter examines the benefits of the procedure. Although
he discusses these briefly, they still get more attention than the benefits
conferred by other pre-medication treatments. Apparently, Shorter wants to
show that lobotomy was not bad enough to raise questions about psychiatry's
bona fides as a medical science. Doing so, however, he goes too far, leaving
it unclear why lobotomy was ethically indefensible in the first place. Thus, he
notes that "'[tihere were some dramatic responses [to lobotomy], and some
long-standing satisfactory responses-all better than the restraint of those same
patients in back wards of mental institutions.' 2 °8 "Follow-up studies, 2 9
according to Shorter, "found that about a third of all psychosurgical patients
had been discharged from [the] hospital and were living at home. 2'0 "Yet," 21'
he continues,
[M]any of these patients would sooner or later have recovered
spontaneously. And the irreversible damage to their brain and spirit
must be weighed against the extra months or years with which they
would have encumbered the institutional system. "Not all so-called
mental disorders were so severe that it was worth exchanging them for
an organic brain syndrome," concluded one student. True, lobotomy
reached the most difficult of the difficult in the back wards. Yet
unlike any of the other physical therapies, it caused deep uneasiness
within the profession of psychiatry, and would be the first of these
therapies to be abandoned as the new antipsychotic drugs came in. 212
None of these arguments, however, explains why Shorter considers lobotomy
"indefensible for ethical reasons." 213 In fact, they often suggest the opposite.
In some cases, lobotomy produced benefits, and, in Shorter's words, it was
"better" than the alternative of staying in the hospital." 4 Why was the "better"
alternative unethical then? The "unethical" course of action would appear to
be withholding a "better" treatment, not administering it. Again, if it was true
that "not all ... mental disorders" reached a level of severity that warranted
208. SHORTER, supra note 2, at 229 (quoting Eben Alexander, A Perspective of the 1940s, 28
SURGERY & NEUROLOGY 320 (1987)).
209. Id.
210. Id. (citing GROB, supra note 11, at 131).
211. Id.
212. Id. (footnotes omitted) (quoting STANLEY FINGER, ORIGINS OF NEUROSCIENCE: A HISTORY OF
EXPLORATIONS INTO BRAIN FUNCTION 294 (1994)).
213. See SHORTER, supra note 2, at 229.
214. See id.
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lobotomy, that hardly meant no mental disorders did. Not all heart conditions
are severe enough to require surgery, for example, but that hardly means no
heart patient should receive surgery or that surgery is unethical. Again,
Shorter remarks that "many... patients would sooner or later have recovered
spontaneously" without treatment, but he does not notice that this argument
constitutes an objection to any treatment whatsoever.2t5 It also conflicts with
the basic point of Shorter's chapter on "Alternatives," namely, that psychiatry
was "caught in a dilemma" in the 1930s because the existing therapeutic
choices-warehousing patients or psychoanalysis-were "unappealing. '216 If
that dilemma explains and justifies other physical treatments in this period, it
should do the same for lobotomy. Moreover, as applied to the "back ward"
patients that Shorter describes, the claims about "spontaneous" recovery were
most likely untrue. Finally, if "irreversible damage to... brain and spirit must
be weighed against. . . extra months or years" of hospitalization as Shorter
says, it would appear that the balance should favor surgery in some cases-
particularly when Shorter himself, in the very same paragraph, has described
surgery as "better" than staying in the hospital.2"7
The incoherence, and even contradictions, in these arguments suggest that
Shorter had difficulty reconciling lobotomy with his larger themes. Other
features of his book suggest the same thing. Thus, the lobotomy discussion
appears in the "Alternatives" chapter, but Shorter describes it as something
quite different from an alternative. He writes instead about the "[Iobotomy
[a]dventure,, 218 as if the treatment was wild and uncharacteristic of psychiatry.
And he implies much the same thing about lobotomy's inventor, Egas
Moniz. 219
According to Shorter, Moniz reported great success with his first twenty
~ 220lobotomy cases, claiming seven "cures" and seven improved patients.
Shorter points out, however, that Moniz provided "little detail to support these
claims '22' and provided an "account of the development of his procedure...
[which] was filled with windy speculation about hypothetical mechanisms. 222
One gets the sense that lobotomy constituted an "adventure," rather than an
alternative, because of Moniz's personal recklessness. Shedding additional
light on Moniz' s motives, Shorter notes that he "had twice been nominated for
215. See id.
216. Id. at 190.
217. See id.
218. SHORTER, supra note 2, at 225.
219. Id. at 226.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 390 n.153.
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a Nobel prize" 223 for work in radiology, rather than psychiatry, but was "twice
turned down. 224 Remarkably, Shorter neglects to add that Moniz later won
the Nobel Prize for inventing lobotomy-a point that would be inconsistent
with Shorter's portrayal of lobotomy as an uncharacteristic "adventure" for
psychiatry.
Describing the first reports of success for other biological treatments,
such as deep sleep or camphor, Shorter had expressed no comparable objection
and offered no criticisms about lack of "detail. 225 Shorter knows, however,
that those reports were no better than Moniz's. Thus, after criticizing Moniz
for providing "little detail," Shorter adds the following: "[Iln fact, this kind of
grandiose communication characterized the first notice of almost all the
physical therapies, their authors eager to ascertain their priority in history and
unaffected as yet by the rigorous statistical tests and follow-up studies that
would later be demanded. 226 In the case of those other therapies, favorable
"first notice[s]" led Shorter to conclude that the treatment "seemed" to work.
Using the same approach, he should have concluded that lobotomy "seemed
to work," too. Moreover, once Shorter conceded that Moniz's reports did not
differ from Cerietti' s or those of other biological pioneers, the idea of Moniz
as an adventurer collapses as well. Once again, we find lobotomy in the
mainstream of mid-twentieth century psychiatry, exactly where Shorter does
not want it.
Lobotomy was, in fact, a dreadful procedure, but because of Shorter's
determination to portray it as an aberration-an "adventure"-he misses the
real criticisms of it. Peter Sterling has demonstrated that lobotomy did not
produce real benefits, that it caused enormous harm, and that psychiatrists'
optimistic portrayals of its supposed successes-the kind of success that
Shorter posits in the tortured paragraph reproduced above-were usually
bogus and outlandish.227 Nor was it true that psychiatrists limited it to "back
ward" patients; in fact, lobotomists preferred to operate on patients with little
history of hospitalization.228
Shorter will not offer such criticisms, however. He limited his point
about "grandiose communications" to the first reports of new treatments-a
kind of law of the new drug for inventors of treatments.229 If numerous
psychiatrists, and not just Moniz, routinely offered bogus evaluations of
lobotomy, reporting that badly damaged subjects had improved, then psychia-
223. SHORTER, supra note 2, at 226.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. See generally Sterling, supra note 3.
228. See generally id.
229. See SHORTER, supra note 2, at 226.
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trists' evaluations of any treatment-from sleep therapy to medications-could
be equally bogus. Shorter struggles mightily against that conclusion.
As an ethical matter, lobotomy was "indefensible," just as Shorter says.
However, if a procedure that becomes unethical because "irreversible damage
to.. . brain and spirit"23 can outweigh "extra months or years with which...
[patients] would.., encumber ... the institutional system," '231 then a strong
case for medications being unethical in the same way can be made. In fact,
George Crane made precisely that case in the 1970s when he criticized
psychiatry for ignoring irreversible brain damage produced by drugs.
For Shorter, however, lobotomy must be sui generis. Lobotomy
represented "a blip in the history of psychiatry," he writes, "a ... study in
medical hubris" '232 that "faded away in the early 1950s almost as abruptly as
it had risen up." '233 No other procedure, from sleep therapy to insulin coma
treatment, resembled it. No other procedure raised inherent "ethical" issues-
not prolonged sleep therapy, despite the death rate associated with it, not drug-
induced convulsions that terrified patients out of their minds, and not any of
the other dangerous treatments that patients were forced to undergo despite a
lack of convincing evidence of efficacy. Apart from the "lobotomy adven-
ture," on Shorter's account, psychiatry boasted an unbroken history of over a
hundred years of treatments that "seemed to work" or "truly worked" and that
involved no ethical problems.2"
Shorter's account of lobotomy highlights two additional aspects of his
historiography. First, focusing on the dispute between psychoanalysts and
biological psychiatrists, he ignores debates and disagreements over particular
biological treatments. Even in the case of lobotomy, which some psychiatrists
touted and others felt "uneasy" about, Shorter does not examine the actual
debates.
Second, Shorter portrays medical treatments and ideas as if they develop
autonomously, uninfluenced by public attitudes, government regulations, or
laws. Virtually everything revolves instead around pure science, a science that
reduces itself to a matter of being right (biological psychiatry) or being wrong
(psychoanalysis). "Ethics" constitutes the only other force in Shorter's scien-
tific universe-lobotomy was effective, yet "unethical"-but ethics plays a
very small role. It is small because only one development-lobotomy-
implicates ethical questions and because Shorter treats ethics as little more
than conforming to the prevailing scientific consensus. Moreover, Shorter's
230. Id. at 229.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 228.
233. Id.
234. See generally SHORTER, supra note 2, at 228.
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ethical considerations do not significantly affect the course of history. In his
view, medications would have supplanted lobotomy during the 1950s even if
no ethical question about the procedure had existed just as medications
supplanted insulin coma therapy.
Shorter is wrong, however, about the cause of lobotomy's demise. The
use of lobotomy had declined dramatically before medications ever appeared
-and years before medications became a standard treatment. 5 It happened
because public confidence in the procedure had collapsed.236 After World War
II and the revelations of Nazi atrocities, the nation's moral climate changed.
Concepts of individual right and dignity had become more robust, and
permanent brain damage had become correspondingly more suspect as a
psychiatric or governmental technique. In this climate, large jury verdicts
against lobotomists loomed as a real threat. For this reason, the law undid
lobotomy more than medications did. Shorter cannot acknowledge this, how-
ever; it belies his view of medical developments as autonomous and driven by
pure science. Shorter's unsatisfactory attempt to fill the gap is what he calls
"ethics."
C. The Medication Era
Shorter approaches the medication era in the way one would expect given
the rest of his book. He says little about the effectiveness of medications,
except that they "work," and even less about drug side effects, including
tardive dyskinesia. The bitter debates that had George Crane at their center
receive no attention nor do law and public attitudes.
Just as he had in the case of other biological therapies, Shorter begins
with anecdotes about early drug successes. These anecdotes do not include
accounts such as that of the first psychiatrist to take thorazine during the
drug's development, who reported feeling "that I was becoming weaker, that
I was dying. It was very painful and agonizing .... I experienced an illness
235. GELMAN, supra note 11, at 25; Sterling, supra note 3, at 135. Shorter acknowledges that "in
Britain, the rate of lobotomies began to decline even before the introduction in the mid-1950s of the new
antipsychotic drugs." SHORTER, supra note 2, at 228. Nonetheless, he asserts that "in both Britain and the
United States, it was unquestionably the advent of these drugs in the spring of 1954 that killed off
lobotomy." Id. In fact, Peter Sterling has shown that lobotomy went into a rapid decline in the United
States before medications appeared. Sterling, supra note 3, at 133. Without citing sources, Shorter
acknowledges that the number of lobotomies declined sharply after the early 1950s, but he ignores the fact
that medications did not come into wide use immediately; it took time. See SHORTER, supra note 2, at 228.
Based on what happened, one could more plausibly argue that medications spread in the vacuum left by the
abandonment of lobotomy (and other biological therapies).
236. GELMAN, supra note 11, at 23.
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more pronounced than depression .... I had felt all along that I was going to
die, but this new state left me indifferent ....,237
Psychiatrists generally called the drugs "major tranquilizers" because
patients became indifferent when taking them. Shorter uses a different term
"antipsychotic, ' '231 which did not come into general use until the 1960s or
later 39 but which better fits his themes. Many psychiatrists during the 1950s
theorized that the medications worked by producing a brain disease or state of
brain dysfunction in patients, just as fever therapy and lobotomy had.240
Shorter fails to mention that either. Indeed, Shorter does not write anything
that could raise an "ethical" or even a serious medical issue concerning
medications nor does he suggest that past psychiatric practices, such as
lobotomy, could in any way color or taint the medication era.
Predictable in outline, Shorter's account includes some noteworthy errors
and misinterpretations. These occur because Shorter's larger themes blind him
to what happened during the medication era. The mistakes range from subtle
to egregious.
On the subtle end of the scale is Shorter's comment on a French
researcher's suggestion in 1952 that chlorpromazine might find its psychiatric
use "in connection with barbiturates in a deep-sleep cure. '241 The researcher's
suggestion was "perhaps tongue in cheek, '242 Shorter writes. Yet the early
French investigators did not think of chlorpromazine as an antipsychotic in the
way Shorter does. Moreover, the drug was developed to potentate anesthesia.
Suggesting that the chlorpromazine would find a use in deep sleep therapy was
perfectly reasonable under the circumstances. Shorter raises the "tongue in
cheek" possibility only because of his own conception of chlorpromazine as
an effective antipsychotic agent, a therapy different in kind from all earlier
treatments. In general, psychiatrists during the 1950s did not think that way. 43
237. JUDITH P. SWAZEY, CHLORPROMAZINE IN PSYCHIATRY: A STUDY OF THERAPEUTiC INNOVATION
117-18 (translating a report by psychiatrist C. Quarti) (1974). Quarti went on to say that the "painful feeling
of imminent death" soon gave way to a sense of "euphoric relaxation" and "extreme feeling of detachment
from myself and... others ... everything was filtered, muted." Id. These changes lasted for about a week.
Id.
238. See, e.g., SHORTER, supra note 2, at 248.
239. See GELMAN, supra note 11, at 65.
240. Id. at 25-26.
241. SHORTER, supra note 2, at 249 (quoting Henri Laborit et al., Un nouveau stabilisateur v'gdtatif
(le 4560 RP) 60 PRESS MtDICALE 208 (1952)).
242. Id.
243. For discussion, see GELMAN, supra note 11, at 24-29. Earlier in his book, Shorter suggested that
another psychiatrist had spoken "tongue in cheek" when observing that "[o]ne may question whether shock
treatments do any good to the patients but there can be no doubt that they have done an enormous amount
of good to psychiatry." SHORTER, supra note 2, at 224 (quoting Louis Casamajor, Notes for an Intimate
History of Neurology and Psychiatry in America, 98 J. NERVOUS & MENTAL DISEASE 607 (1943)). In this
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More serious errors appear in Shorter's cursory discussion of side effects.
Quoting Heinz Lehmann's early observations of medicated patients in 1953,
Shorter writes that the patients "walked with a peculiarly stiff gait"2" and "had
that peculiar mask-like face" '245 suggestive of Parkinsonism. 246 According to
Shorter, these "symptoms would later be called tardive dyskinesia" 24 7-which
is simply not the case. Dyskinesias are abnormal movements. Stiffness is not
a dyskinesia. Moreover, tardive dyskinesia generally occurs late in treatment
-hence the word "tardive"-rather than at the early treatment stages that
Lehmann was observing. Neither in 1953 nor today would those symptoms
be described as either "tardive" or as "dyskinesias." Shorter's mistake is quite
remarkable for a serious history, and it suggests a profound lack of interest on
his part in medication side effects. 48
The balance of Shorter's account of side effects is also flawed. In discus-
sing the phenomenon of deinstitutionalization, he writes: "[T]he antipsychotic
medications that in hospital had provided such effective relief were often not
taken once the patients were on the street because of tardive dyskinesia, the
troublesome side effect that caused facial twitches and other involuntary
movements. 249 Yet that certainly is not what happened. Side effects besides
tardive dyskinesia-and notably the capacity of medications to make many
people feel horrible-led patients to stop taking medications. Before the late
1970s, few people in the mental health system even knew about tardive
dyskinesia, and in most cases, patients do not experience it as unbearably
distressing. Shorter possibly cites tardive dyskinesia because he had reverted
to the idea that that disorder includes all abnormal, drug-induced states, or he
may have confused psychiatrists' view of tardive dyskinesia-that it is the
only side effect with wide potential significance for prescribing practice-with
the views of patients. This represents one of very few passages in the book
concerned with patients' feelings and actions, as opposed to psychiatrists', and
instance, too, nothing suggests that the remark was tongue in cheek. In fact, it parallels Shorter's own
suggestion that some therapies were good for psychiatrists, whatever they did for patients.
244. SHORTER, supra note 2, at 253 (quoting Heinz Lehmann, The Introduction of Chlorpromazine
to North America, 14 PSYCHIATRIC J. U. OTTAWA 263,265 (1989)).
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. George Crane and others came to believe that drug-induced Parkinson's symptoms, like stiffness
and tremor, might later evolve into tardive dyskinesia but this position was not widely held-and, in any
case, it would be meaningless to hold it if Parkinsonism was "tardive dyskinesia." See George E. Crane,
Two Decades of Psychopharmacology and Community Mental Health, Old and New Problems of the
Schizophrenic Patient, 36 TRANSACTIONS OF THE N.Y. ACADEMY OF Scl. 644, 646 (2d ser. 1975).
249. SHORTER, supra note 2, at 281. Immediately after his initial reference to tardive dyskinesia, see
supra text accompanying note 44, Shorter used similar language, writing that deinstitutionalized patients
would "stop taking their medication" in order to avoid the "side effect" called "tardive dyskinesia."
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Shorter certainly is in the habit of viewing everything from the psychiatrists'
point of view.
Shorter's account of deinstitutionalization is flawed not just in its details
but at its core. He deems deinstitutionalization a disaster, rightly calling it
"one of the greatest social debacles of our time. 250  However, Shorter
misplaces the responsibility for the "debacle." He lays the chief blame on the
"antipsychiatry" movement, which was mainly made up of nonpsychiatrists.
Antipsychiatrists believed that "psychiatric illness is not medical in nature but
social, political, and legal. 25!  Academic writings by the movement's
intellectual leaders during the 1960s and 1970s-Michel Foucault, Thomas
Szasz, and Erving Goffman-proved "influential among university elites, 252
Shorter observes, "cultivating a rage against mental hospitals and the whole
psychiatric enterprise. 253
Hospital populations began a slight decline during the mid-1950s, shortly
after the appearance of antipsychotic medications. 254  Since the antipsy-
chiatrists had not yet published their books, Shorter allows that "[i]n a strict
sense ... deinstitutionalization was a consequence of the second biological
psychiatry and not the antipsychiatry movement."'255  Nonetheless, the
principal fault lies with the movement:
Yet if drug therapy kicked deinstitutionalization off, what kept it
going, driving patients of all kinds into the community whether they
were treatable with drugs or not? It was the combined pressure of the
antipsychiatry movement outside of medicine and of the ideology of
community psychiatry within medicine. The antipsychiatry move-
ment preached that mental hospitals as such were wicked, given that
there was no such thing as mental illness. And well-meaning psychia-
trists who had absorbed the teachings of [community psychiatry
theorists] . . . believed that "therapeutic communities" could be
constituted out there in the cold streets of big cities ....256
250. SHORTER, supra note 2, at 277.
251. Id. at 274.
252. Id. at 275.
253. Id.
254. For discussion, see supra text accompanying note 24.
255. SHORTER, supra note 2, at 280. This observation conflates medications with the second
biological psychiatry, even though elsewhere in the book Shorter dates the second biological psychiatry
from the 1970s.
256. Id. In the "Alternatives" chapter, Shorter had described the development of social and
community psychiatry theory, which occurred predominantly in England. See id. at 229-38. In Shorter's
system, this theory was not part of the "second biological psychiatry."
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Shorter's explanation hardly seems credible, however. In fact, large-scale
deinstitutionalization resulted from a political decision by state governors and
legislatures to reduce-and eventually all but eliminate-state mental
hospitals. Judges and commitment law reforms possibly contributed some-
thing to the process as well. For its implementation, deinstitutionalization
relied on clinical, that is to say, biological, psychiatrists. Working at state
institutions and community agencies, these physicians discharged patients
from hospitals and, in many instances, refused to re-admit them when they
became ill again. Moreover, as George Crane had observed, deinstitutionaliza-
tion depended on medicating virtually every patient-again, something only
psychiatrists could do.257 Leading biological psychiatrists were among the
pioneering theorists of deinstitutionalization as well." 8
To accept Shorter's analysis, one must believe that the tracts of anti-
psychiatrists and the writings of British psychiatrists who theorized about
"therapeutic communities" had cast a spell over governors, legislators, judges,
and over the psychiatrists who implemented deinstitutionalization. That
simply did not happen, and it borders on fanciful to suppose it did. Political
officials and judges hardly spent their time plodding through antipsychiatrist
texts. Rather, as New York Governor Averill Harriman explained when he
decided to authorize widespread use of medications in state hospitals, the goal
was saving money.259 Governors had also tired of the endless scandals that
engulfed state hospitals.26
It is true that some of the lawyers who sued mental hospitals in the 1960s
and 1970s espoused "antipsychiatrist" views. 261 These lawyers did not decide
the cases however, judges did. Nor did these lawyers settle cases on behalf of
states and then implement the settlement by discharging of patients wholesale.
The states did that. Moreover, whether they denied existence of mental illness
or not, the lawyers did little at critical junctures to check the use of medication,
something essential to deinstitutionalization.262 In their actions, then, the
lawyers were more pro-deinstitutionalization than "anti-psychiatry." Indeed,
since psychiatry largely supported deinstitutionalization--despite Shorter's
claims-the lawyers were actually aligned with psychiatric goals, not opposed
to them.263
257. See infra text accompanying note 269.
258. GELMAN, supra note 11, at 72-75.
259. Id. at 40.
260. Id.
261. See Nancy K. Rhoden, The Limits of Liberty: Deinstitutionalization, Homelessness, and
Libertarian Theory, 31 EMORY LJ. 375, 403 (1982).
262. For discussion, see GELMAN, supra note 11, at 121-34.
263. Id.
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Crane himself receives a single mention from Shorter in a footnote that,
unsurprisingly, badly distorts his views.26' The footnote cites a 1973 article by
Crane to support Shorter's argument that because of tardive dyskinesia,
patients "out on the street ' 265 stopped taking medications, which "had provided
such effective relief' 21 in the hospital. According to Shorter, Crane's article
was "an early prise de conscience of this problem.
267
Crane's article did focus on deinstitutionalization and on tardive
dyskinesia, a disorder that, according to Crane, psychiatrists "seem[ed] to be
completely unconcerned about., 268 But Crane, unlike Shorter, never imagined
that medications "provided such effective relief" in hospitals. To the contrary,
Crane's article reported that "fewer than 50 percent of patients hospitalized for
several years improve in response to neuroleptics. '269 Combined with the high
risk of serious side effects, drugs' limited effectiveness made the practice of
medicating every patient indefensible,270 Crane argued. Quite naturally, Crane
held psychiatrists and clinical psychopharmacology responsible.271 Indeed, he
considered their view of medications an essential part of deinstitutionalization.
Shorter's blaming "antipsychiatrists" would have struck Crane as absurd.
Shorter gets deinstitutionalization wrong in part because of his insistence
that psychiatric ideas and debates-exclusive of legal, social, or political
concerns-explain everything in the history of psychiatry. For that reason, he
ignores the powerful political impetus to dismantle the state hospital system.
Shorter also gets deinstitutionalization wrong because he will not concede that
psychiatry is capable of any systematic wrong. If deinstitutionalization
represents a debacle-and Shorter says it does-then the fault must lie with
antipsychiatrists, not psychiatrists.
The idea that psychiatry is incapable of systematic wrong to patients-
anything more sustained and serious, that is, than a "blip" in history-lies at
the heart of Shorter's approach to his subject. Medications, like other
biological therapies, benefit from this principle. It is almost inconceivable that
the profession Shorter portrays could have performed during the medication
era in the way Crane described. If Shorter is right about psychiatry's history,
Crane had to be wrong about medications. By the same token, if Crane was
right about medications-and Crane was right-then something is very wrong
in Shorter's history.
264. SHORTER, supra note 2, at 406 n.153.
265. Id. at281.
266. Id.
267. Id. at 406 n. 153.
268. George E. Crane, Clinical Psychopharmacology in Its 20th Year, 181 SCIENCE 124, 127 (1973).
269. Id. at 125.
270. Id. at 126-27.
271. See id. at 125.
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Shorter's belief in the absolute autonomy of psychiatric ideas and in the
blamelessness of psychiatrists leads to a kind Manichean history, one in which
a battle between two forces-right and wrong---determines everything.
Shorter's scheme of three periods frames this as struggle of biological
psychiatry versus psychoanalysis. However, as befits a Manichean history, at
bottom, Shorter sees a struggle between psychiatry and antipsychiatry.
Antipsychiatrists consider psychiatry a social, political, and legal
creation, nothing more. That position leads them to overlook distinctively
medical developments and to presume that psychiatry can do nothing right.
Shorter, on the other hand, is an "anti-antipsychiatrist." He views psychiatric
developments and debates as completely free from social, political, and legal
influences.272 Thus, he attributes the "debacle" of deinstitutionalization to an
academic mistake by professors of history and sociology about the nature of
psychiatry and mental illness.
On principle, then, Shorter ignores psychiatry's problems and highlights
antipsychiatry's. Just as psychiatry can do no wrong, antipsychiatry can do
nothing right. Since Shorter allocates deinstitutionalization to the realm of
antipsychiatry, he readily acknowledges the problems that affected that policy.
But since psychiatry actually caused those problems, Shorter's account of
deinstitutionalization includes some remarkable facts that his approach to
psychiatry had ruled out. From these examples, we learn that the shortcomings
in Shorter's history are not due to lack of knowledge on his part; instead, they
result from his unwillingness to fault psychiatry.
The paragraph that blames antipsychiatrists and community theorists for
"driving patients... into the community whether they were treatable with
drugs or not, ' 273 is one example. The cryptic phrase "treatable with drugs or
not" is Shorter's only acknowledgement that medications have limited
effectiveness. It is difficult to say which is more remarkable: the fact that
Shorter blames antipsychiatrists, who do not believe in mental illness, for
failing to appreciate that some patients should remain drug-free, or the fact that
Shorter writes at length about medications but ignores the limitations of the
treatment, except for those he associates with the antipsychiatrists.
The second example relates to Shorter's basic conception of biological
treatments from the 1920s and 1930s, as justifiable "alternatives" to
"warehous[ing]" patients."274 "At the outset,9275 Shorter writes,
272. Remarkably, Shorter says in the introduction that he has tried to write a "social history" of
psychiatry. SHORTER, supra note 2, at viii. By social history, however, Shorter apparently means no more
than an attempt to "recapturfe] the lives of some of the major players." Id.
273. Id. (emphasis added).
274. Id.
275. Id.
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[AIll of these alternatives had an aura of desperateness about them,
seemingly radical and possibly quite dangerous innovations. This
desperateness must be understood in the context of the time. The
asylums were filing, and psychiatry stood helpless in the face of
disorders of the brain and mind. In these years, the profession reached
the nadir of its descent from the therapeutic promises that had
beckoned so brightly a century before .... [Tihe center of gravity of
psychiatry lay in the mental hospitals. In these snake pits, a bleakness
prevailed that would have turned away any but the most resolute
young medical graduate.276
Shorter takes a different view of matters, however, when antipsychiatrists
-- or those Shorter associates with them-criticize mental hospitals. Books
published in the late 1940s by a journalist named Albert Deutsch,277 and films
such as The Snake Pit dating from the same period, depicted what Shorter
himself calls the bleakness of mental hospitals. Describing these
developments from the 1940s, Shorter writes:
Midst this horrendous publicity for psychiatry, on which the
antipsychiatric movement would later feed, several basic realities were
obscured. One is that most patients younger than 65 were discharged
relatively rapidly from mental hospitals: They did not experience
prolonged stays to say nothing of lifelong incarceration .... Second,
much of the bizarre posturing and disordered movement that Deutsch
and later antipsychiatric writers ascribed to "hospitalism," meaning
the iatrogenic results of institutionalization, turned out to be an
inherent biological feature of such illnesses as schizophrenia that, in
affecting the entire brain, affect the entire nervous system as well.
Third, even though conditions in mental hospitals were unsettling
enough, there were worse alternatives. One was being tossed to the
mercy of the streets. 278
Thus, antipsychiatrists and their allies commit fundamental errors by ignoring
patients who fared relatively well in hospitals and by overlooking the
possibility of "worse alternatives" than institutions. Yet Shorter himself
commits exactly those errors when discussing "alternatives" to hospitalization
in the 1920s and 1930s-that is, the biological therapies such as prolonged
276. Id. at 190.
277. ALBERT DEUTSCH, THE SHAME OF THE STATES (1948).
278. SHORTER, supra note 2, at 278-79 (internal references omitted). Interestingly, Shorter made a
similar point about hospitalization as an alternative to lobotomy; see discussion supra text accompanying
note 210.
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sleep and coma therapy. When considering those treatments, Shorter never
mentions that some patients might fare relatively well in the hospital nor does
he consider the possibility that those treatments represented a "worse
alternative" than doing nothing. The supposed difference between these
situations does not rest on any facts; it simply follows from Shorter's premise
that psychiatrists can do nothing wrong and the critics of psychiatry can do
nothing right. It is not that psychiatrists escape blame for harsh therapies
because no alternative existed. Rather, no alternative existed in Shorter's view
because, as a matter of principle, he will not blame psychiatrists.
D. Progress and Revolutions
During the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, many psychiatrists came to regard
medication as a revolutionary treatment that had transformed their discipline
and rewritten its history. 79 On this view, there was the medication era in
psychiatry and an earlier, virtually irrelevant, professional past.28  Nothing
existed in between.
Thinking this way carried obvious-and for psychiatry, highly desirable
-implications. It made psychiatry's history before 1953 irrelevant in
evaluating the profession or its capabilities. Not only did nineteenth century
procedures, like removing patient's ovaries, become relics of the irrelevant
past, so did mid-twentieth measures like lobotomy, which the public had come
to revile.
This idea of medications as revolutionary plays some role in Shorter's
book. He even refers to a medication "revolution. 28' More generally, Shorter
believes in scientific progress. He portrays the first and second biological
psychiatries as similar in fundamental ways, but also recognizes that the later
period boasted real scientific knowledge about the brain, not just a vague
biological orientation. Nor are medications the same thing as prolonged sleep
therapy in Shorter's view. In addition, Shorter occasionally considers earlier
treatments in light of the medication revolution to come. Writing about the
older therapies, he observes that "[s]ome... proved to be dead ends and were
discarded; others became the basis of a new vision of psychotherapy; still
others laid the groundwork for the revolution in drug therapy... after World
War 11.,282 Thus, Shorter places favored therapies on the path of progress.
Yet Shorter is not a full-fledged revolution historian. He does not believe
that medications fundamentally changed psychiatry. The kinship he sees
279. GELMAN, supra note 11, at 70. Views of the "medication revolution" are described in id. at 70-
71,223-29.
280. Id.
281. SHORTER, supra note 2, at 190.
282. Id.
2003]
HeinOnline  -- 29 Ohio N.U. L. Rev. 569 2002-2003
OHIO NORTHERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
between the first and second biological psychiatries reveals a basic continuity
in psychiatric history, not revolutionary change. Whether in 1890 or 1980, the
biological psychiatrists were right, and everyone else, wrong, in Shorter's
view. Moreover, Shorter acknowledges that physicians discovered medica-
tions serendipitously; their discovery did not build on scientific work by sleep
therapists or insulin coma physicians.
Nor is Shorter a simple "progress" historian. Progress historians see the
present as a kind of purpose that the past aimed to achieve. They justify the
past because it produced the present. Shorter, however, allows older therapies
only the most tenuous connections to modem treatment. Often, the older
therapy contributed little more than hope. Shorter writes, for example, that
fever therapy demonstrated one kind of insanity (neurosyphilis) to be "cur-
able., 283 Prolonged sleep therapy "offered the prospect of cure,' ' 21 "address-
[ed] the brain, 285 and, apparently for that reason, "marked the beginning of a
revolution in psychiatry. 286 Drug-induced convulsions represented steps on
the path to electroconvulsive therapy, which remains in use.287 Insulin coma
gives Shorter difficulty on this count, though he emphasizes that it represented
a "substantial improvement" over doing nothing, and he makes a halfhearted
effort to connect it with ECT.288 None of these connections seem substantial
-wouldn't psychiatrists have wanted to cure psychosis if fever therapy and
prolonged sleep had never existed?-and Shorter in fact makes relatively little
of them. They represent little more than bows in the direction of progress.
The older biological treatments stand on their own merits, as Shorter
views them, with no need for the progress rationale. The treatments "seemed
to work," according to Shorter, and were superior to available alternatives.
Reading his book, one simply does not get the sense that prolonged sleep
therapy and coma treatment would have been unjustifiable had they not led (in
some obscure way) to medications and ECT. Progress historians value the
past because it produced the present. Shorter generally values psychiatry's
past for its own sake.289
283. Id. at 196.
284. Id. at 206.
285. Id. at 205.
286. SHORTER, supra note 2, at 207.
287. See id. at 214.
288. Id. Shorter writes that insulin coma "seemed to be a procedure that actually worked" and
"represented a substantial improvement on what was available before, which is to say, nothing." Id. He
goes on to say that the drug metrazol, which "produced convulsions without coma," represented "the true
beginning of convulsive therapy." Id. Shorter's attempt to link insulin with metrazol, and his strange
suggestion that comas were a poor precursor to convulsions, both bespeak an effort to place insulin coma
treatment on one of the paths of progress.
289. Without changing a great deal, Shorter might possibly recast his narrative to better fit the
progress mold. In order to do that, Shorter could present the "psychoanalytic hiatus" as something that
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An example will illustrate the role that progress and revolutions play in
Shorter's History. Discussing the introduction of medications in 1953, Shorter
quotes the recollections of Heinz Lehmann, a pioneering Canadian clinical
psychiatrist. Before medications appeared, Lehmann found it "pretty horrible
to work under ... [mental hospital] conditions."29  Being "convinced that
psychotic conditions... had some sort of biological substrate,"29 ' Lehmann
had "kept experimenting." '292 He treated patients with "very large doses of
caffeine. 293 He "injected sulfur suspended in oil," '294 producing only pain and
fever. He "injected typhoid antitoxin, 295 hoping to duplicate the success of
malaria therapy. He "even injected turpentine into the abdominal muscles ' 296
in order to "produce ... a huge sterile abscess. 297 All these measures had
been suggested by other psychiatrists, but Lehmann found "[n]one... had any
effect."298
Then, in 1953, a pharmaceutical salesperson gave Lehmann some
medication samples and sales literature. 299 Lehmann suspected the new drug
was only a sedative.3" But the sales literature claimed that medications
"'acted like a chemical lobotomy,"' 31 which impressed him. On that basis,
and because he considered the psychiatrists who had discovered medications
"very sophisticated, 30 2 Lehmann tried the new drugs.30 3 The rest was history.
Shorter takes the view one would expect of Lehmann's pre-medication
experiments. "The point,' 3 °" Shorter writes,
is not that researchers such as Lehmann behaved inhumanely with
their patients: They were searching in the best of faith for something
interrupted the processes of progress in psychiatry. Such an account would have to include casual
connections between the first biological psychiatry and the second one, which Shorter does not supply. It
might also require that Shorter demonstrate progress as treatments evolved from prolonged sleep to insulin
coma. Such a narrative would not be impossible to write. I do not think it would be convincing, however,
nor, in my view, did Shorter attempt to write it.
290. SHORTER, supra note 2, at 247 (quoting Lehmann, supra note 244, at 263).
291. id.
292. id.
293. Id.
294. Id.
295. SHORTER, supra note 2, at 247 (quoting Lehmann, supra note 244, at 263).
296. Id.
297. Id. at 248.
298. Id.
299. Id. at 252 (citing David Healy's then-unpublished interview with Lehmann).
300. SHORTER, supra note 2, at 252.
301. Id.
302. Id.
303. Id.
304. Id. at 248.
2003]
HeinOnline  -- 29 Ohio N.U. L. Rev. 571 2002-2003
OHIO NORTHERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
better to offer them. It is rather that, by the time in 1951 that [research
began into antipsychotics,] ... the ground had already been well pre-
pared for the reception of new... drugs.30 5
This "point" conflicts, however, with some of Shorter's larger themes. Shorter
claims that psychiatrists held lobotomy in disrepute at the start of the medica-
tion era. However, we now know that the drug company marketed
medications as "chemical lobotomies"-and the marketing pitch resonated
with Lehmann. If psychiatrists were truly concerned about the "ethical" issues
surrounding lobotomy as Shorter says, this marketing strategy made no sense.
Moreover, if insulin coma therapy really "seemed to work," and if ECT
produced the successes that Shorter claims, it is unclear why Lehmann felt so
discouraged about mental hospitals, or why he resorted to drastic measures like
toxin and turpentine injections. Shorter repeats the "alternatives" rationale-
psychiatrists like Lehmann were "searching in the best of faith for something
better" -but he forgets that the original alternatives, the coma and convulsive
treatments, seemingly had succeeded by this time.
These details aside, many readers will simply not accept Shorter's "point"
about Lehmann. Instead, they will think Lehmann "behaved inhumanely" by
injecting patients with sulfur, toxins, and turpentine. On that basis, readers
may distrust all Lehman's judgments, including his subsequent assessment of
medications. They may also distrust psychiatrists generally or at least
psychiatrists like Lehmann. Such a reaction is natural. It involves looking at
later events through the lens of earlier ones-or, if not that, looking at two
events (injecting turpentine and injecting medications) as if they had occurred
simultaneously. Critics of psychiatry-particularly antipsychiatrists--often
employ such views, tarring the field with its history of crude treatments.
Shorter, like many of these critics, sees the same fundamental processes
at work in psychiatry's present and its past. Critics argue that the same
professional processes lie behind medications and prolonged sleep
therapy-and that we should therefore consider medications as if they were
like prolonged sleep therapy. Shorter agrees with critics' premise. He thinks
that the same professional processes have been at work throughout psychiatric
history, but he wants us to think of prolonged sleep therapy as a good thing,
not a bad one. And that creates a problem for Shorter's position.
This problem can be explored with a simple model. Shorter treats the
periods of psychiatry's history as if they were unfolding simultaneously in
three different rooms inside a building marked "Science." Within Room #1,
biological psychiatrists of the late nineteenth century proceed scientifically and
pursue promising leads but have achieved no breakthroughs in understanding
305. SHORTER, supra note 2, at 248.
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the brain as of yet. In Room #2, the psychoanalysts are not attending to
science at all; instead, they ramble on about their patients' parents and child-
hoods. In Room #3, biological psychiatrists proceed very much like those in
Room #1 except that because of a serendipitous discovery, they have acquired
a deeper understanding of the brain. The psychiatrists in Rooms #1 and #3
obviously practice the same profession and belong in the same building, but
the same cannot be said about the psychoanalysts in Room #2.
Viewed in this way, Shorter's view is not inherently implausible. The
existence of Rooms #1 and #2 does not make the scientific breakthroughs in
Room #3 less likely or believable. This model, however, omits biological
treatments. So instead of building marked "Science," imagine one called
"Mental Hospital." Again, there are three rooms. Inside Room la,
psychiatrists inject turpentine and toxins into patients, induce comas and
perform lobotomies. In Room 2a, they talk about patients' childhoods and
dreams. In Room 3a, they administer psychiatric medications. In this model,
the existence of Room 1 a might lead an observer to question the entire hospital
and everything that happens within it, including in Room 3a. If a hospital
harbors Room la, something is fundamentally wrong with the entire
institution.
Shorter deals with this conceptual problem in three ways, two of which
I have already described. First, he portrays the benefits of older treatments
using ambiguous-and ultimately, misleading-phrases, such as "seemed to
work," while largely ignoring side effects. This makes older treatments appear
more benign, but it does not entirely eliminate the difficulty. One remains
suspicious of inducing comas and convulsions in patients as a treatment for
mental distress. Second, Shorter defines the periods of psychiatry's history-
in our model, the rooms-solely with reference to general theories of mental
illness. Pre-medication treatments do not unfold inside the theoretical rooms
-Rooms #1, 2, and 3 in our model. Rather, Shorter places those treatments
in their own chapter. Yet the treatments belong in psychiatry's history some-
where. If they cannot be found within the rooms, they must be located some-
where else in the building-in unmarked rooms perhaps, or in the hallways.
Neither possibility helps Shorter very much.
Progress is Shorter's third way of dealing with the problem. Using the
model of buildings and rooms, progress gives us a reason to focus on Room
3a (medications), and not Room la (turpentine, toxins, and lobotomy) when
thinking about events in the "Mental Hospital" building. Knowledgeable and
insightful observers might not need a heuristic aid-like progress. Without it,
they may still understand that the events in Room la only appear "inhumane"
on the surface. But many people, perhaps ruled by emotions, require some-
thing to help them understand-something like the idea of progress. With its
help, one can think of Lehmann as the doctor who pioneered the use of
medications after he had tried other treatments-and not as the psychiatrist
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who treated patients, at different times, with toxins, turpentine, and medica-
tions.
E. Neoapologists and Revisionists
In matters of historiography, Shorter describes himself as a "neoapo-
logist"3 ° for psychiatry and his opponents as "revisionists. 3 °7  Revisionist
historians deny the existence of mental illness and presume that "doctors act
not in the interest of their patients or of science, but to shore up their own
sagging authority. 30 8 Neoapologists, on the other hand, hold that mental
illness exists and that psychiatrists generally act scientifically in the interest of
patients. 309 Thus, historical revisionists qualify as antipsychiatrists and histor-
ical neoapologists as biological psychiatrists. (Recall that in order to qualify
as a biological psychiatrist, one only need believe in the biological basis of
mental illness.) Remarkably then, Shorter sees historians divided along
precisely the same lines as psychiatrists, over precisely the same basic issues
-a view that makes the historiography of psychiatry something very much
like a subdivision of psychiatry itself.
Shorter says that his first objective in writing the book was "to rescue the
history of psychiatry from the sectarians who have made the subject a sandbox
for their ideologies."31 In light of the parallels between historiography and
psychiatry, Shorter probably equates criticism of prevailing practice in
biological psychiatry with sectarianism and ideology. But if anything deserves
the label "ideological," Shorter's book does. It presumes that biological
psychiatry can do no wrong. And its selection of facts and topics is rigidly
determined by his assumptions about the autonomy and blamelessness of
psychiatry.
Thus, we learn little about the side effects of treatments or, for that
matter, about treatment benefits. The existence of side effects would threaten
the assumption that psychiatry does no wrong, particularly since psychiatrists
often ignored those effects. And treatment benefits require little attention
because of the assumption that psychiatry is beneficial and benign. Thus,
Shorter omits the very things that one would like to learn from a history of
psychiatry.
306. Id. at ix. Shorter distinguishes neoapologists from "real apologists" on the ground that the latter
believe that "the rise of the asylum represented undiluted progress in the alleviation of human misery." Id.
at viii. He might have added that neoapologists believe the same thing about developments in biological
psychiatry.
307. See id. at ix.
308. Id.
309. Neoapologists also hold that psychiatrists' pursuit of professional self-interest and authority
"ends up explaining little of a complex story." Id. at ix.
310. SHORTER, supra note 2, at viii.
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The failings of Shorter's account, such as they are, do not result from an
unwillingness on his part to make judgments about past actors and events.
His is not a neutral history written without a point of view. Instead, Shorter
makes numerous evaluative judgments about the past. He considers lobotomy
unethical, for example, and the "psychoanalytic hiatus" as a colossal mistake.
Antipsychiatrists qualify past historical actors too, and Shorter simply
denounces them.
In Shorter's Manichean history, to be a biological psychiatrist was to be
right in all times and places-even when biological theories were vapid and
biological treatments crude. To criticize biological psychiatry was wrong,
again in all times and places, even when biological theories had nothing to
offer. Problems that psychiatry had obvious responsibility for-most notably,
deinstitutionalization-Shorter blames on antipsychiatrists, as if harm could
come only from them.3 ' Facts inconsistent with his story of psychiatric
triumph-for example, many patients do not respond to medications-Shorter
also connects with antipsychiatrists, as if French philosophers and American
sociologists were responsible for medical shortcomings." 2 Shorter justifies
harsh psychiatric treatments on the ground that anything was better than
asylums, and he criticizes antipsychiatrists for overlooking the fact that some
things were worse than asylums." Throughout, Shorter virtually ignores the
harm caused by psychiatrists and psychiatric interventions. Lobotomy, an
apparent exception, he dismisses as an aberration.
Imagine a history written to the same standards as Shorter's but defending
opposite conclusions. This history would describe the harms older psychiatric
interventions caused and report summarily that the treatments "seemed"
ineffective." 4 It would denounce psychiatrists' motives in using these
treatments.315 It would place the entire blame for deinstitutionalization on
psychiatrists, ignoring the role played by states.3 16 Regarding more recent
developments, it would report that medications "truly caused brain damage, 3 17
and describe two or three individuals seriously damaged by drug treatment.
Drug benefits would receive passing mention in one or two sentences-
sentences that misused the basic terminology.1 8 Throughout, the successes
311. For discussion, see supra part IV(C).
312. For discussion, see id.
313. For discussion, see id.
314. For discussion of Shorter's treatment of this point, see supra text accompanying notes 170-77.
315. For discussion of Shorter's treatment of this point, see supra text accompanying note 305.
316. For discussion of Shorter's treatment of this point, see supra text accompanying note 251.
317. Compare Shorter's description of medications as a treatment that "truly worked," discussed
supra text accompanying notes 174-77.
318. Compare Shorter's account of tardive dyskinesia, discussed supra text accompanying notes 247-
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achieved by psychiatry would be ignored or else portrayed as aberrational. Of
course, such a history would be sectarian and ideological but no more than
Shorter's own history.
In either version, ideological history omits much that a history of
psychiatry should include. Without knowing how well treatments worked and
the harms they caused, we cannot assess psychiatrists' performance nor do
treatments themselves tell the whole story. Potentially beneficial therapies
may be abused, but we cannot know whether that happens without examining
how psychiatrists actually use treatments.
For the medication era in particular, Shorter's approach produces a false
picture. His historiography, as noted above, practically ruled out George
Crane's criticisms of psychiatrists and medication practices. Crane had
charged psychiatrists with systematic abuse of a potentially beneficial
treatment when, for Shorter, the entire history of psychiatry made such abuse
a virtual impossibility. We can now see something else in Shorter's approach
-something even more basic-that precludes criticisms like Crane's. How
psychiatrists perform-as opposed to what therapies psychiatrists possess or
what they believe about mental illness--does not appear to be a legitimate
question for Shorter. Certainly, Shorter does not ask it. Thus, Crane offered
not only the wrong answer, but the wrong question-and "wrong" in every
sense of the word.
Crane's critics regarded him as not just mistaken but as professionally
deranged. For those critics and for Shorter alike, some questions simply do
not get asked and to pose those questions marks one as anti-psychiatry, which
is to say, is responsible for everything that goes wrong. (One of Crane's critics
suggested that patients needed protection, not from side effects, but from
Crane.)31 9 Nor is it without significance that Shorter dates the triumphant
emergence of the second biological psychiatry at the very time when leading
psychiatrists were denouncing Crane and insisting on a tardive dyskinesia rate
of 1 in 1,000,000. In this way at least, Shorter's suggestion of a fundamental
identity between psychiatry and psychiatric historiography is correct. Shorter
has written a history that goes hand in hand with the views of psychiatrists
who denied tardive dyskinesia' s existence at the birth of the "second biological
psychiatry."
319. GELMAN, supra note 11, at 82 (citing George E. Crane, Tardive Dyskinesia in Schizophrenic
Patients Treated with Psychotropic Drugs, 9 AGGRESSOLOGIE 209, 218 (1967) (reporting an "emergency
discussion" following the reading of Crane's paper). The psychiatrist Herman Denber charged that
"sweeping, generalized conclusions" such as Crane's would "undo the past 15 years of work" in psychiatry
-that is, the medication era-and he exhorted "each psychiatrist who treats patients to speak for and defend
them." Id. In context, it seems clear that the patients needed to be defended against Crane. For discussion
of Denber's criticisms, and of similar criticisms by Nathan Kline, see id. at 81-87.
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F. Why Not a Revolution?
Although Shorter sheds little light on psychiatry's past, his approach is
revealing about the writing of history and also about our present situation.
Shorter did not take the easiest path for an apologist. He did not argue that a
medication revolution had fundamentally transformed the field, making
psychiatry's questionable past irrelevant,3 20 nor did Shorter take the next
easiest path, which is to argue that judgments about psychiatry's past are
impossible from our present vantage point. Instead, as already noted, he
makes all kinds of judgments about biological psychiatry, antipsychiatrists,
and treatments.32'
Why would an apologist endorse the history of sickening patients,
convulsing them, and making them comatose when alternative historical
techniques exist-techniques that wall off psychiatry's past? Possibly,
Shorter's primary allegiance lies with history rather than psychiatry. For the
sake of professional pride perhaps, he wants to invest the past with as much
relevance as he can or perhaps he simply considers the older treatments
justifiable.
Whatever Shorter's personal reasons, the history of apologetics for
psychiatry over the past four decades suggests a different kind of answer. In
1964, a pivotal study of medications had suggested a vision of psychiatric
history very much like Shorter' S.322 This study contributed greatly to the idea
of medication as a revolutionary treatment--one that reversed schizophrenic
processes in the brain. Yet the study's authors also portrayed older psychiatric
treatments as effective, commenting that "it has been clear for many decades
[prior to 1964] that acute schizophrenic patients had reasonable chances of
improving with available treatments. 323 Moreover, like Shorter, the authors
focused on psychiatrists' mindset and outlook and not merely on the outcomes
of treatment for patients. Despite the effectiveness of older therapies, they
noted, "there generally has been a cautious and skeptical, if not nihilistic,
attitude [among psychiatrists] toward the prognosis of schizophrenia. How-
ever, in the past two decades the situation has greatly improved, and consider-
able optimism now attends the treatment of acute schizophrenia., 324 Indeed,
they thought that the study's findings about medication "lend strong support
320. For discussion, see supra Part IV(E).
321. For discussion see supra this part.
322. NIMH Psychopharmacology Service Center Collaborative Study Group, Phenothiazine
Treatment in Acute Schizophrenia, 10 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 246 (1964).
323. Id. at 256.
324. Id.
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to the rising optimism about and confidence in the treatment of acute
schizophrenic psychoses. '325
Compare this to Shorter's remarkably similar claims regarding the
therapies of the1930s: "The historical record.., shows that coma and shock
gave psychiatrists powerful new therapies in a field dominated for half a
century by nihilistic hopelessness, and it is against that sense of despair that
they must be set., 32
6
Looking back on the 1964 study today, its combination of faith in older
treatments with a view of medications as a revolutionary advance is striking.
Of course, there is nothing illogical about holding the two positions
simultaneously. The existence of effective treatments for a disease does not
preclude the possibility of better treatments emerging later. In the wake of the
1964 study, however, psychiatrists had embraced not only the idea of medica-
tions reversing schizophrenic brain processes, but also the idea of medications
as revolutionary treatment that had transformed psychiatry and made the
profession's past irrelevant-precisely because of medications' supposed
actions in the brain.327 It was as if medications cured not only schizophrenia,
but the problems of psychiatry as well.
An early synthesis of those ideas appeared in a work of history interest-
ingly enough. In a 1974 book about the development of medications, Judith
Swazey had described the 1964 study as "the most definitive demonstration of
a fact gradually perceived by psychiatrists during the 1950s: that CPZ
[chlorpromazine] is not just a 'glorified sedative,' a drug uniquely effective in
controlling psychotic excitation, but a true 'antischizophrenic' drug, with
highly specific actions against the range of symptoms characterizing the
schizophrenic illness. 328
Yet little reason existed to believe that medications exert "highly
specific" actions against schizophrenia.329 Swazey was creating a medication
revolution more than she was describing one. Nonetheless, the view of
medications as antischizophrenic treatment-and therefore a revolutionary
treatment-took hold in the late 1960s. Before then, it had seemed perfectly
reasonable to describe medications as a major advance and also to suppose that
no medical revolution had occurred in psychiatry. It was the very success of
the 1964 study in portraying medications as "antischizophrenic" that makes its
historical vision seem odd today.
325. id. at 257.
326. SHORTER, supra note 2, at 208.
327. For discussion, see GELMAN, supra note 11, at 59-76.
328. SwAzEY, supra note 237, at 16-17.
329. GELMAN, supra note 11, at 53-54; GROB, supra note 11, at 152-53.
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If the 1964 study's portrayal of history and pre-medication treatments
now appears anomalous, what of Shorter's book, which adopts a similar
historical view? Like the study, Shorter both regards medications as a major
advance and posits a basic continuity in psychiatric history. He does not
perceive the introduction of medications in 1953 as the beginning of a new era;
his second biological psychiatry does not commence until a decade and a half
later. Also like the study, Shorter focuses on the way that treatments affected
the outlook of psychiatrists (as noted above).
The authors of the study wrote under conditions very different from
Shorter's, which makes the similarities between them even more remarkable.
The 1964 study offered a pioneering demonstration of medications' effective-
ness. With very few exceptions, previous studies of medication had involved
about the same degree of rigor as studies of lobotomy had. Planning for the
study dated back almost a decade and those responsible for it had the lobotomy
debacle firmly in mind. They did not want the profession to endure a similar
disaster because of drugs.33° In short, the study was born out of defensiveness.
The study's authors could not have known how successful their
conception of "antischizophrenia" medication would become or how quickly
medications would dominate psychiatry. Moreover, the senior and middle
generations of psychiatrists in 1964 had used the older biological therapies
freely during their careers. In all likelihood, they did not want to hear that
medications had relegated their previous work to the dustbin of medical
history.
When Shorter's book appeared in 1997, the situation was different.
Medications had taken over psychiatry, their superiority an article of faith.
The senior generation of psychiatrists had always used medications. For good
or ill, the treatment had transformed the public mental health system.
No less significant in the late 1990s was the fact that prevailing practice
in psychiatry had survived serious threats, both internal and external.
Internally, there had been George Crane and the profession's failure to
acknowledge tardive dyskinesia-a side effect-and a professional failure that
many had feared would produce a lobotomy-like public reaction against
medications. Externally, psychiatric practices had survived the litigation of the
1970s and 1980s, which had threatened drastic changes. By 1990, it had
become clear that courts would do little, if anything, to interfere with the use
of medications.
In the wake of these developments, another conception of psychiatry and
its history emerged. According to Robert Michels and Peter Marzuk, psychia-
try had "undergone a profound transformation in recent years' 33' as its "focus
330. GELMAN, supra note 11, at 53; GROB, supra note 11, at 152.
33 1. GELMAN, supra note 11, at 208 (quoting Robert Michels and Peter M. Marzuk, Progress in
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of research ... shifted from the mind to the brain" '332 and its conception of
psychiatric illness "shifted from a model of... disorders based on maladaptive
psychological processes to one based on medical disease." '333 Noting that
many key research conclusions remained unconfirmed and that "only a few
have been translated into clinical practice,""33 Michels and Marzuk nonetheless
concluded on a triumphant note:
A 1975 review . . . described psychiatry as "the battered child of
medicine... born in witchcraft and demoniacal possession, feared by
the public, often scorned by the family of medical specialists, and
dependent for much of its existence upon handouts from public
agencies." One of the findings of research on high-risk children is
that the majority do very well. Fortunately, psychiatry is in this
majority. Its basic research is among the most exciting in contempo-
rary medicine, its diagnoses are reliable, its treatments are effective,
and the stigma that has long marked both its patients and its practitio-
ners is rapidly disappearing .... The battered child [of psychiatry] has
been transformed by a tumultuous adolescence into a vigorous and
successful young adult.335
Michels and Marzuk anticipate much of Shorter's account. Like Shorter,
they regard biological research-not treatment or clinical practice-as the
defining feature of modern psychiatry. Like Shorter, they praise modern
treatments without focusing on them. And, like Shorter, they date the birth of
modern psychiatry, not from the appearance of medications in 1953, but
sometime later. Shorter dates the second biological psychiatry from 1970.
Michels and Marzuk say the transformation occurred in "recent years."
From psychiatrists' point of view, this conception was superior to the idea
of a medication revolution in a number of respects. An old revolution is
hardly something to brag about in science or medicine, and medications had
appeared forty years earlier. Moreover, medications had also lost much of
their luster since the 1970s. The very research that Michels and Marzuk touted
had demonstrated that medications were not a magic bullet against schizophre-
nia. There were also serious side effects-including fatal ones-that
psychiatrists could not deny. At the same time, many people with schizophre-
nia remained desperately ill despite drug treatment. The public mental health
system based on medications was performing badly. And though psychiatric
Psychiatry (parts I & 2), 329 NEW ENG. J. OF MED. 552 & 628(1993)). For discussion of Michels' and
Marzuk's views, see GELMAN, supra note 11, at 208-09.
332. Id.
333. Id. at 209.
334. Id.
335. Michels & Marzuk, supra note 331, at 635 (footnotes omitted).
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practice had survived, the battles over tardive dyskinesia and the litigation had
surely taken a toll.
Michels' and Marzuk's conception solved all these problems in a single
stroke. Psychiatry's stature-indeed, its identity-now rested on brain
research not on treatment, clinical practice, or public health. It followed that
any problems in those realms-treatment-resistant patients and serious side
effects that get systematically ignored, a public mental health disaster-should
not diminish psychiatry's stature. If Michels and Marzuk were right,
psychiatry had become immune from future criticism, except on account of its
research. And who would, or could, take issue with that?
336
The new conception also removed any threat from psychiatry's past.
With the profession transformed into a brain science, events before the
transformation-particularly events in the realms of clinical practice or public
health-could have little relevance to presentday. More than just the standard
conception of a revolution, Michels and Marzuk propounded a future-oriented
vision, one forever focused on tomorrow's research advances. What happened
yesterday-indeed, what is happening today-pales in bright light from the
future. And just in case one explores the past anyway, Michels and Marzuk
offer their developmental metaphor for psychiatry. The profession endured a
"battered childhood" they say-remarkably, Michels and Marzuk identify
psychiatrists as the prime victims in psychiatry's history-but it grew
nonetheless into a "vigorous and successful young adulthood." '37 Nothing
suggests that anyone outside the profession-patients, for example-ever
suffered harm at the hands of psychiatrists. But if they did, it was, at most, a
juvenile offense by the young and battered profession.
Shorter's history is best understood as a variation of Michels' and
Marzuk's. Both accounts offer a triumphalist view of psychiatry-one that all
but immunizes the profession against criticism. Their common features-
psychiatry as primarily a brain science and research enterprise, a de-emphasis
on clinical practice, and a supposed historical transformation occurring well
after the appearance of medications-are described above. Their differences
involve events before the recent transformation of the field. For Michels and
Marzuk, what happened was the profession's "battered childhood." For
Shorter, what happened was the first biological psychiatry, the fall from grace
represented by psychoanalysis, and the series of treatments that "seemed to
work." Michels and Marzuk would as soon forget psychiatry's past, seeing no
336. One answer to this not entirely rhetorical question is "David Healy." Healy faults research
pertaining to "atypical" antipsychotics and antidepressants and laments the influence of drug companies on
psychiatric research. HEALY, supra note 77; for examples of Healy's views, see supra text accompanying
notes 77-78, 89-91, 192.
337. See Michels & Marzuk, supra note 331, at 635.
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point in dredging up old memories. Shorter, on the other hand, embraces
psychiatry's past and its treatments.
Shorter is a historian. Unlike Michels and Marzuk, who are psychiatric
researchers, if Shorter writes off psychiatry's past, he writes off his own
profession. Nor can historians remain true to their vocation and focus, as
Michels and Marzuk suggest, on the future. Thus, Shorter had to take
psychiatry's past seriously. At the same time, he did not have to view it as he
did or adopt'so much of Michels' and Marzuk's triumphant account.
In fact, Shorter offers an even more triumphant account than Michels and
Marzuk do. They glory in psychiatry's present and future by dismissing its
past. But Shorter finds glory in that past as well. Except for psychoanalysis
and antipsychiatry, he sees no occasion for anything but pride in what
happened. In my view, his contribution is noteworthy precisely because it
goes farther in this respect than other recent apologies for psychiatry.
Imagine two versions of a nation's, rather than a profession's, history.
Questionable episodes and worse dot that nation's past. But one view of the
nation ignores its past on the ground that the country has undergone a
transformation and that its future is bright. Beyond a vague reference to the
nation as a victim ("battered national childhood"), the past virtually disappears
from this account. The other account, in contrast, does not overlook the past.
Instead, it glories in what happened. This second account either selectively
ignores questionable episodes, or explains them away on the ground that
whatever the nation did, represented the best "alternative" at the time.
Questionable episodes get attributed to the nefarious actions of an "anti" group
opposed to everything the nation holds dear.
The first account, which parallels Michels' and Marzuk's, would justify
great freedom of national action. It says, in effect, that the nation has much to
offer, that it has a destiny, and that it will do the right thing. The second
account, which parallels Shorter's, justifies even greater freedom of action. It
says, in effect, that the nation virtually always does the right thing- even
when it might appear otherwise-and that the nation is beset by mortal
enemies. From that, it is only a short step to the conclusion that whatever the
nation does, it is right.
The same kind of implications, I believe, inhere in these accounts of
psychiatry. Michels' and Marzuk's version suggests that psychiatrists should
have great freedom of action, which would mean great freedom from legal
regulation. (It also means that psychiatrists should have the necessary finan-
cial resources.) Shorter's version suggests the same things but more strongly.
If virtually nothing warranted criticism in psychiatry's past, what could
possibly deserve criticism in its future? Someone who refuses to even concede
psychiatry's "troubled childhood"-and Michels and Marzuk surely did not
mean that the "trouble" was caused by psychoanalysts and antipsychiatrists-
will probably admit to no faults whatsoever, regardless of what happened in
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the past or might happen in the future. Portraying psychiatry's past as he does,
Shorter does not need a revolution.
V. CONCLUSION
This brings us back to our starting point-the law. Given Shorter's
assumptions about the autonomy of psychiatry-his idea that psychiatry
develops independently of any social, political, or legal influence-it is hardly
surprising that he says virtually nothing about legal matters. Shorter does
observe that ECT faced legislative and judicial restrictions in the 1980s, which
he blames on patients' rights groups. The story has a happy ending, however,
because ECT made a comeback in the 1990s, gaining increasing professional
support.338 Shorter drops the legal thread in that story, but one gets the sense
that the law only reacted to antipsychiatric agitation-again, the autonomy of
psychiatric developments-and that the legal mistake was short-lived.
Shorter also describes an early 1980s lawsuit against Chestnut Lodge, a
private mental hospital that favored psychoanalytic treatments.33 9 A patient
brought a malpractice action against the hospital because doctors had failed to
treat him with medications.? This litigation attracted enormous attention
from psychiatrists before being settled. 34' Shorter rightly observes that, despite
the lack of definitive court ruling, clinicians who treated patients without drugs
now realized that they "ran the risk of incurring heavy [legal] penalties. 342 He
is also right that the case pushed psychoanalysis further from the medical
mainstream. Since the law conformed to psychiatric developments in this
instance-at least, as those developments are portrayed by Shorter-the case
comports with Shorter's ideas about the autonomy of psychiatry. I said at the
outset that the law and the writing of psychiatric history were related in two
ways. Despite its negligible attention to legal matters, Shorter's history illu-
strates these relationships.
The first connection involves the motives for writing about psychiatry's
past. Legal concerns-political and social concerns as well-lie at the heart
of many histories, even when law barely gets mentioned. Histories like
Shorter's represent extended arguments for psychiatry remaining free from
legal and social regulation. The implicit argument is: Why should the law
interfere when things are going so well? The law may as well mandate an
orchestra violinist play better as dictate to a psychiatrist-at least if psychia-
trists perform in the way Shorter says they do.
338. SHORTER, supra note 2, at 285.
339. Id. at 309 (citing accounts of the case, which is unreported).
340. Id.
341. Id. at 309-10.
342. Id. at 310.
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At the present moment, the second connection between law and
psychiatric historiography is even more significant. The triumphant claims of
Shorter and others are possible only because courts and laws failed to control
-and barely acknowledged-psychiatrists' excesses during the medication
era. The amount of unnecessary suffering by patients during this period is
beyond calculation as is the affront to patient dignitary occasioned by psychia-
trists' systematic denials of drug-caused harms. As millions of patients
suffered permanent damage, psychiatrists acted-and today historians write-
as though nothing of importance happened. George Crane described psychia-
trists' performance during the medication era as a professional default without
precedent in the history of medicine, and I have no reason to disagree.
Had the law held psychiatrists to account, histories like Shorter's would
be inconceivable. He portrays a period of unprecedented professional default
as an era of medical triumph. As noted already, Shorter even dates this
triumph-the emergence of the second biological psychiatry-to 1970, the
very time when Crane was being reviled for calling attention to tardive
dyskinesia. Only because of the default of the legal system-its failure, for
whatever reason, to document the problem and intercede-are the claims of
historical triumph taken seriously. Indeed, they are regarded as self-evident.
Although the courts have spoken on these subjects, it is worth considering
the natural of effect of a history like Shorter's on judicial deliberations. For
a variety of issues affecting patients' rights, the U.S. Supreme Court has
decided that courts should "defer" to the professional judgment of psychia-
trists. Yet what of the Court's decision to adopt a deferential stance in the first
place? In part, it must have rested on a decision that psychiatry warrants
deference. Were psychiatrists performing wholesale lobotomies, for example,
it is unlikely that courts would defer to the profession.
If Shorter is right, an extremely deferential stance by courts is proper.
With psychiatrists performing well, legal interference is uncalled for. As
noted already, however, Shorter's judgments do actually rest on a serious
assessment of psychiatry's performance. Instead, his judgments of particular
events are dictated by the premise that psychiatrists do not commit systematic
wrongs.
Interestingly, and I think not coincidentally, the U.S. Supreme Court has
taken an approach like Shorter's in two pivotal cases. A 1982 decision, Romeo
v. Youngberg,43 announced the "deference to professional judgment" stand-
ard.3 In Romeo, the Court observed that a deferential test was necessary "to
enable [psychiatric] institutions ... to continue to function., 34' Here, the
343. 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
344. Id. at 323.
345. Id. at 324.
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opinion was referring to state institutions for persons with developmental
disabilities but the general point is the same as Shorter's-psychiatric auto-
nomy from law. The Court did not reach its conclusion based on any per-
ceived successes of psychiatric institutions. Indeed, the institution in question
was notoriously bad. Rather, the Court was deferring to psychiatry, not
because of its treatments but just because it was psychiatry-Shorter's,
Michels', and Marzuk's point exactly.
The second case is Washington v. Harper,3 6 a 1990 decision upholding
forced medication of prisoners. Reaching that result, the Justices did not
hesitate to describe the side effects of treatment, including tardive dyskin-
esia,347 nor did the Court assert that medications reversed any disease pro-
cesses in the brains of prisoners. "The purpose of drugs, 348 Justice Kennedy
wrote, "is to alter the chemical balance in a patient's brain, leading to changes,
intended to be beneficial, in his or her cognitive process. '349 Leaving out
"chemical balance" phrasing, Justice Kennedy could have written the same
thing about lobotomy. Leaving out lobotomy-and only lobotomy-Shorter
could have written the same thing about any biological treatment in psychiatry.
346. 494 U.S. 290 (1990).
347. Id. at 229-30.
348. Id. at 229.
349. Id.
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